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Abstract 
 
In this dissertation, I investigate how auditors integrate information technology (IT) 
specialist input on internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) issue classifications. Given 
the ill-structured nature of ICFR issue classifications and the importance of appropriate 
classification due to the potential impact on audit quality, combining knowledge from different 
perspectives is likely beneficial. Drawing on social identity theory, expertise, and advice 
literatures, I predict and find benefits result from a weaker shared team identity between auditors 
and IT specialists. Specifically, I find auditors with a weaker team identity place more weight on 
IT specialist input for IT-related issues and are more likely to differentiate between more and 
less accurate input, compared to auditors sharing a stronger team identity with the IT specialist 
providing the input. My dissertation provides a better understanding of how a key aspect of the 
audit team environment, team identity, influences auditor integration of input from audit 
specialists. The implications of my dissertation are of interest to researchers, regulators, and 
practitioners, especially as recent audit firm initiatives likely increase the extent to which 
auditors and IT specialists view themselves as one team. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Audits teams made up of auditors and specialists, including IT, valuation, and tax, 
commonly work together to complete the required audit procedures and reach (ideally) 
appropriate audit conclusions. Regulators are concerned with the number of internal control over 
financial reporting (ICFR) related audit deficiencies noted in PCAOB inspection reports and cite 
ineffective coordination and communication with IT specialists as a root cause of these 
deficiencies (PCAOB 2012). The classification of ICFR issues (i.e., material weakness versus 
significant deficiency versus control deficiency) impacts the adjustments required to planned 
audit procedures (PCAOB 2007), and thus, directly influences overall audit quality. The ill-
structured nature and limited guidance in standards make ICFR classification difficult (Earley, 
Hoffman, and Joe 2008). As such, integrating auditor perspectives with perspectives of 
individuals with differing functional backgrounds, such as information technology (IT) 
specialists with expertise in control areas, is likely beneficial. In this dissertation, I 
experimentally investigate auditor integration of input from IT specialists in the context of 
evaluating ICFR issues and how a key aspect of the audit team environment, strength of team 
identity, influences the extent of integration.  
IT plays a key role in financial statement audits today due to the complexity of business 
environments and increased use of a controls-based audit approach (EY 2012; PwC 2012; Curtis, 
Jenkins, Bedard, and Deis 2009). Research shows that auditors generally are not well equipped 
to evaluate IT-related control risks and deficiencies (Brazel and Agoglia 2007; Wolfe, Mauldin, 
and Diaz 2009). IT specialists often view themselves as risk and control experts (Bauer and 
Estep 2014) as their work typically focuses on risk and control areas. While better classifications 
of ICFR issues could occur from combining auditor and IT specialist knowledge, especially 
	2 
when an issue is IT-related, evidence of integration problems exists. In addition to the concerns 
regarding communication and coordination between auditors and IT specialists noted above, 
regulators contend, and recent interview-based research finds, that auditors overrely on specialist 
areas (Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous 2014; Griffith 2015a; Boritz, Kochetova-Kozloski, 
Robinson, and Wong 2015). Overreliance could result from auditors 1) taking information 
provided by specialists without question, or 2) discounting issues brought up by specialists so the 
auditor can continue to rely, as planned, on specialist areas for the audit. These regulator 
concerns and research findings motivate the need to identify ways to improve auditor integration 
of specialist input. 
Recognizing team member expertise helps decision makers use input from others to (try 
to) improve judgments (Harvey, Harries, and Fischer 2000; Einhorn, Hogarth, and Klempner 
1977). In the auditor-specialist context, relevant social identities can influence the salience of 
specialist expertise. Social identities, such as team identity (i.e., the extent to which individuals 
view themselves and others as part of the same team) influence perceptions of self and others, 
increasing similarity perceptions for in-group members and dissimilarity perceptions for out-
group members. As a result, higher (lower) perceived similarity likely decreases (increases) the 
salience of a specialist’s expertise, which will impact the weight auditors place on input received.  
Social identity theory studies show individuals tend to hold more positive impressions of 
in-group members and highly value information from those with whom they share stronger 
social identities. However, a stronger team identity may not always be beneficial in the auditor-
specialist context as stronger identities, or social bonds, can also heighten the risk of being too 
trusting (Dukerich, Kramer, and Parks 1998; Kadous, Leiby, and Peecher 2013). To understand 
how the strength of team identity influences auditor integration of IT specialist input, I 
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investigate how an aspect of input quality – input accuracy – and team identity jointly influence 
input weighting across different types of ICFR issues – those that overlap (IT-related) and do not 
overlap (non-IT related) with the IT specialists’ area of expertise. Input accuracy refers to input 
that differs in terms of the level of correctness; more accurate input is closer to being correct than 
less accurate input. Examining input accuracy provides a comparative benchmark for evaluating 
the appropriateness of the weight of input employed by auditors. 
Auditors can likely identify more versus less accurate input for non-IT related issues due 
to the relevance of their own knowledge and expertise. However, sharing a stronger team identity 
with IT specialists can increase auditors’ propensity to blindly trust (Kadous et al. 2013) and 
decreases the salience of specialists’ IT expertise as auditors will perceive IT specialists as more 
similar to themselves (Ashforth and Mael 1989). Thus, for non-IT related issues, I predict 
auditors with a stronger team identity will weight input relatively heavily regardless of input 
accuracy, while auditors with a weaker team identity will more heavily weight more versus less 
accurate input. 
For IT-related ICFR issues, auditors’ knowledge and expertise is less helpful for 
distinguishing between input accuracy levels (compared to non-IT issues). A weaker team 
identity heightens the salience of the IT specialist’s domain of expertise as these auditors see the 
IT specialist as more dissimilar than themselves. Auditors sharing a weaker team identity will 
view IT specialist input as more informative (Gino, Shang, and Croson 2009), compared to 
auditors sharing a stronger team identity. Thus, for IT-related ICFR issues, I predict auditors 
with a weaker team identity will weight input received from an IT specialist more heavily than 
those with a stronger identity. 
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My study employs a 2x2x(2x2) mixed design. I manipulate stronger versus weaker team 
identity with the IT specialist and more versus less accurate input between subjects. Experienced 
auditor participants read and provide judgments on four client cases with ICFR issues adapted 
from Earley, Hoffman, and Joe (2008). The within-subjects manipulations occur via client case 
as each client case contains an ICFR issue that is either IT-related or not IT-related. For 
robustness, I include higher and lower severity cases; my main interest lies in investigating the 
higher severity (i.e., more problematic) cases. Results for the lower severity cases are discussed 
in supplemental analyses. 
Participants provide initial severity and classification judgments of the ICFR issues in 
each case and then receive a description of an IT specialist who will be providing input on each 
case, with wording inducing either a stronger or weaker team identity with the IT specialist 
(between-subjects). The IT specialist in the stronger (weaker) condition enjoys (does not enjoy) 
thinking about audit versus consulting-related issues, sits (does not sit) with the audit team while 
on-site at the client, and the participant views the IT specialist as a core (just obligatory) member 
of the team. Participants then provide final judgments for each case while viewing their initial 
judgment and IT specialist input, which varies in its accuracy. The degree to which auditors 
weight the IT specialist input for their ICFR issue classification judgments serves as the main 
dependent variable of interest. 
Consistent with my predictions, I find benefits to auditors who share a weaker team 
identity with IT specialists. My main results show, for a non-IT related issue, auditors are more 
likely to appropriately differentiate between more and less accurate input when they share a 
weaker versus stronger team identity. When an ICFR issue is IT-related, auditors with a weaker 
team identity weight input received from an IT specialist heavier than those with a stronger 
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identity. Further, auditors with a weaker team identity more frequently mention the IT specialist 
and the IT aspects of the case when describing their judgment rationale. 
 My dissertation provides evidence on how a weaker team identity can be beneficial, 
supported by social identity theory. Auditors with a weaker versus stronger team identity weight 
input more on IT-related issues, i.e., where IT specialists’ input is most relevant and important 
due to auditor’s lack of knowledge and expertise. Further, auditors with a stronger team identity 
are less sensitive to input quality across both IT and non-IT issues than auditors with a weaker 
team identity. Thus, I identify an aspect of the audit team environment, audit team identity 
strength that can decrease the likelihood of auditors benefitting from a specialist’s expertise, 
which is key given the importance of audit specialists in today’s audit environment (Griffith et 
al. 2014; Boritz et al. 2015; Griffith 2015a, 2015b). While I investigate IT specialists, my theory 
likely generalizes to other audit specialists (e.g., tax, valuation). Future research should continue 
to investigate influence of audit team identity on how auditors and specialists work together.  
As prior research on social identity theory shows, there are certainly benefits of a 
stronger team identity between auditors and specialists, such as loyalty, cooperation, and 
information sharing. My dissertation highlights a downside to stronger team identity, where the 
decrease in the salience of IT specialist expertise results in less integration of IT specialist input 
on IT-related issues. This motivates future research to examine conditions under which the same 
degree of integration can occur with stronger team identities. For example, two-way interaction 
between auditors and IT specialists could help overcome this issue, provided other process losses 
of interacting groups are not activated (Trotman, Bauer, and Humphreys 2015). 
My dissertation also highlights a previously unidentified benefit of audit firms increasing 
focus on consulting services. While firms are pushing auditors and specialists to adopt a one-
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team perspective (EY 2013; Bauer and Estep 2016), the dual role of specialists as auditors and 
consultants can decrease the extent to which auditors identify with and view specialists as part of 
the audit team, increasing the salience of their expertise. Thus, in addition to the knowledge 
spillovers gained from specialists working on consulting engagements (Deloitte 2013; PwC 
2013), auditors will be more likely to incorporate input on matters directly related to the 
specialists’ area of expertise due to specialists’ dual roles. 
I organize the remainder of this dissertation as follows. Chapter II provides theory and 
hypotheses development. Chapter III describes the experimental design employed to test the 
hypotheses. Chapter IV discusses results and Chapter V concludes, including fruitful avenues for 
future research.  
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II. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
IT specialist input on ICFR issues 
Internal control over financial reporting (ICFR) issues indicate failures in internal control, 
and have serious implications for financial reporting quality. The classification of ICFR issues as 
a control deficiency, significant deficiency, or material weakness directly impacts audit quality 
as the level of severity of the ICFR issue determines the degree to which the planned audit 
procedures need to be altered (PCAOB 2007). Insufficient adjustments to planned audit 
procedures in light of ICFR issues may result in insufficient evidence to support audit 
conclusions. Attaining accuracy and/or consensus on ill-structured tasks, such as classifying an 
ICFR issue, is difficult (Earley et al. 2008). Integrating different perspectives from individuals 
with differing functional backgrounds likely helps improve classification accuracy/consensus.  
While Auditing Standard No. 5 (PCAOB 2007) provides guidance for classifying 
identified ICFR deficiencies, this guidance is subjective and often difficult to apply to actual 
deficiencies. For example, a material weakness, the most severe classification, exists if “there is 
a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the company’s annual or interim financial 
statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis” (PCAOB 2007, A7). A significant 
deficiency, the next most severe classification, is defined as “a deficiency…that is less severe 
than a material weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by those responsible for 
oversight of the company’s financial reporting” (PCAOB 2007, A11).1 Indicators of material 
weaknesses in ICFR include identification of fraud, restatement of previously issued financial 
statements, and ineffective oversight of the company’s external financial reporting and ICFR by 
the company’s audit committee (PCAOB 2007, 69). Regulators have recently expressed concern 																																																								
1 Significant deficiencies are typically reported internally to the audit committee by either client management or the 
auditor, but not externally reported (PCAOB 2007). 
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that companies and auditors have a difficult time assessing the classification of ICFR 
deficiencies noted and/or anchor on the indicators, resulting in underreporting of material 
weaknesses and reporting of material weaknesses only when a related material misstatement has 
been identified (Chasan 2013; Croteau 2013; Franzel 2014).  
While auditors rely on specialists for certain procedures, auditors determine final 
judgments and decisions in the audit context and own the workpapers and audit file (Bauer and 
Estep 2014; Griffith 2015a). Unlike formal consultation, auditors have no obligation to follow 
any input or advice received from audit specialists (Boritz et al. 2015; Bauer and Estep 2016). 
Prior literature on advice shows that judges seek out and weight advice in order to improve their 
judgments and to share responsibility (Harvey and Fischer 1997; Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). 
Given that auditors utilize specialists on audits because they are ill-equipped to perform certain 
aspects of the audit (PCAOB 2012, 2015), improving judgment and shared responsibility likely 
motivate auditors to at least attempt to assess and incorporate input received from IT specialists.2 
IT specialists play an increasingly important role in audits as both business complexity 
and reliance on system generated data and reports grow (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2011; EY 
2012; PwC 2012).3  They directly influence external financial statement audits for public 
companies due to the requirement of an opinion over ICFR and increasing reliance on IT as part 
of a controls-based audit approach (Janvrin, Bierstaker, and Lowe 2008; Curtis, Jenkins, Bedard, 
and Deis 2009; Bauer and Estep 2014, 2016). IT specialist work on an audit engagement 																																																								
2 I use the term “input” to represent information, advice, or recommendations that auditors receive from IT 
specialists. My definition of input is similar to “advice” in prior psychology and auditing literature and points to the 
ownership auditors ultimately have over the audit process. 
3 AU Section 336 Using the Work of a Specialist does not apply to tax or IT specialists, nor does it apply to 
specialists employed by the auditor’s firm (PCAOB 2003). These types of specialists fall under Auditing Standard 
No. 10 Supervision of the Audit Engagement (PCAOB 2010). The PCAOB recently solicited comments on Staff 
Consultation Paper No. 2015-01 The Auditor’s Use of the Work of Specialists, which considers potential revisions to 
these standards to improve guidance around the use of specialist work, including possibly revising the definition of 
specialist to include tax and IT specialist areas and extend the revised AU Section 336 guidance to apply to 
specialists employed by the auditor’s firm as well. 
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typically focuses on risk and control areas, and IT specialists often view themselves as risk and 
control experts (Bauer and Estep 2014). 
IT specialists are frequently included on audit engagements (Janvrin et al. 2009; Bauer 
and Estep 2016), but are generally less homogenous than auditors, often varying in educational 
background and lacking training as accountants (Brazel and Agoglia 2007; Bauer and Estep 
2014). Audit firms typically employ IT specialists either as part of the assurance or advisory (i.e., 
consulting) group within the firm. Audit firms have expanded their consulting practices 
considerably in recent years (Rapoport 2012; The Economist 2012), with consulting related 
revenue exceeding audit revenue at Big 4 firms in 2013 (Lisic, Myers, Pawlewicz, and Seidel 
2015). Audit specialists, including IT, serve dual roles in audit firms today: consultant on 
advisory engagements and auditor on integrated and financial statement audit engagements. 
Audit firms claim that specialists’ expertise improves audit quality due to bringing knowledge 
gained from serving on consulting engagements to audit engagements (Deloitte 2013; PwC 
2013).4 However, the extent to which the potential benefits of the knowledge spillover from 
specialists are realized depends on whether auditors integrate information and input received. 
IT specialists can provide insight and knowledge on ICFR issues in general, but input on 
issues with IT aspects is especially valuable as evidence exists that auditors are not well 
equipped to evaluate IT-related risks and control deficiencies. For example, Wolfe et al. (2009) 
show auditors are susceptible to management persuasion tactics for IT, but not manual control 
issues. Auditors with lower self-perceived IT expertise assess control risk lower than auditors 
with higher self-perceived IT expertise (Brazel and Agoglia 2007). Further, auditors often lack 
even a base level of training in IT areas and thus, may not understand the purpose and scope of 																																																								
4 Data from a sample of IT specialists (N = 24) provides support for IT specialists spending time on both audit and 
advisory/consulting engagements. On average, IT specialists in the sample spend 66% on audits, 32% on 
consulting/advisory, and 2% on other areas; only three spend 100% of their time dedicated to audit work. 
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IT specialist work and subsequent reliance allowable (PCAOB 2012; Bauer and Estep 2014, 
2016). Regulators allege a lack of appropriate testing related to system-generated report data 
used in control and substantive testing. When IT-related control issues are identified, insufficient 
adjustments to planned audit procedures occur, resulting in ineffective audit procedures and 
lowered audit quality (PCAOB 2012).  
Given the ill-structured nature of classifying ICFR deficiencies and evidence of 
ineffective auditor decision making in this setting, auditor integration of input from IT specialists 
on IT-related ICFR issues is particularly important. It is unclear whether auditors properly use 
input received from IT specialists. Regulators allege and recent research suggests overreliance on 
audit specialists and specialist areas. Overreliance can result from 1) not challenging specialist 
provided input (i.e., accepting at face value) or 2) ignoring issues and concerns raised by 
specialists, resulting in inappropriate reliance (or overreliance) on specialist areas, e.g., IT audit 
aspects. Regulators allude to the first type of overreliance in discussing concerns about reliance 
on valuation specialists; for example, auditors purportedly do not expend the effort to understand 
or challenge the assumptions valuation specialists include in valuation models. For IT specialists, 
the second type of overreliance has been noted. Specifically, PCAOB inspectors noted undue 
reliance on IT-dependent controls and system generated information and cite ineffective 
communication and coordination with IT specialists as a root cause of this undue reliance.  
For auditors to properly integrate IT specialist input, they first need to recognize input 
received as important. Tension exists in the current context as to whether or not auditors will 
recognize IT specialist input as important. Prior studies show auditors dispute the value of IT 
specialists and often view IT specialists as “budget busters” (Vendrzyk and Bagranoff 2003; 
Curtis et al. 2009; Bauer and Estep 2016). Bauer and Estep (2016) provide evidence that 
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relationship quality has been improving in recent years and auditors are better able to see the 
value in IT specialists and their input on audit engagements. 
Weight of input: Influence of team identity 
Prior research shows recognition of specific team member’s expertise is key to improving 
judgments (Einhorn et al. 1977; Libby, Trotman, and Zimmer 1987) and integration of 
information received from others (Harvey et al. 2000). While IT specialists are by definition the 
IT experts on the team, the social aspect of the exchange of information between auditors and IT 
specialists may influence the extent to which auditors recognize and acknowledge that expertise. 
Social identities influence attitudes and behaviors of individuals, perceptions of in-group (i.e., 
those with whom an individual shares a relevant, salient identity) and out-group members, and 
perceptions of self (Tajfel 1978; Ashforth and Mael 1989). Bauer and Estep (2016) provide 
evidence that variation exists in the level of team identity between auditors and IT specialists on 
audit engagements (i.e., the extent to which auditors and IT specialists see themselves as one 
audit team). As lower level identities (e.g., department, workgroup) can have relatively more 
influence on behavior (Ashforth and Johnson 2001) than higher level identities (e.g., professional 
and organizational), the strength of shared team identity between auditors and IT specialists is an 
important social identity to consider in this context and likely influences auditor’s perceptions or 
recognition of IT specialist expertise.5 
Work on social identity theory shows individuals typically value input more from an in-
group member than out-group member and have more positive impressions of in-group members 
(Ashforth and Mael 1989; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Validzic 1998; Van der Vegt and Bunderson 																																																								
5 Tension exists as to whether team identity is influential in the audit team setting as Smith and Kida (1991) show 
some established judgment-related biases do not generalize to settings where auditors perform familiar tasks. 
However, evidence of influential team identities has been noted across a variety of organizational and professional 
settings including research and development teams, military training, and medicine (e.g., Van der Vegt and 
Bunderson 2005; Hewett, Watson, Gallois, Ward, and Leggett 2009; Schaubroeck, Peng, and Hannah 2013). 
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2005; Kane, Argote, and Levine 2005; Kane 2010). For example, Kane et al. (2005) provide 
evidence that groups sharing an identity with a rotating member more likely adopt a superior 
production routine from that rotator than groups that do not share an identity with the rotator. 
Research in accounting also provides evidence of the benefits of a stronger team identity. For 
example, a stronger team identity leads to greater coordination, which improves the effectiveness 
of a horizontal incentive system (Towry 2003) and increased group cohesion leads to more 
creative group solutions (Chen, Williamson, and Zhou 2012). King (2002) finds group affiliation 
among auditor-subjects diminishes the negative bias resulting from repeated auditor-client 
interactions due to social pressure to conform to group norms in an experimental economics 
setting. Despite the likely increase in perceived value of IT specialist input, it is unclear whether 
increasing the strength of team identity would benefit auditor weighting of IT specialist input. 
Sharing a stronger audit team identity with an IT specialist increases the perceived 
similarity with that IT specialist (Ashforth and Mael 1989) and makes the IT expertise of the 
specialist less salient. Thus, auditors who share a stronger audit team identity view the IT 
specialists as more similar to themselves. 6 A stronger shared identity can also result in members 
placing too much trust in information from an in-group member (Dukerich et al. 1998). Kadous 
et al. (2013) find that auditors weight advice from a stronger social bond peer similarly 
regardless of whether strong or weak justification (i.e., higher or lower input quality) 
accompanies the advice; they refer to this tendency as evidence of auditors employing a trust 
																																																								
6 Research on groupthink is consistent with the premise that a stronger team identity (and increased perceived 
similarity) may result in negative team behaviors. Groupthink refers to the tendency of group members to think and 
act similarly due to a desire for harmony and conformity. A large literature provides evidence of poorer decision 
quality resulting from groupthink as members are less likely to bring up dissenting viewpoints, challenge one 
another, or critically evaluate alternatives (see Esser 1998 for a review). 
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heuristic. When a weaker social bond exists, auditors’ weight on advice increases, with stronger 
justification strength.7 
In the current study, I investigate a different aspect of input quality – accuracy of input. 
IT specialist input likely varies in terms of quality (e.g., accuracy) due to differences in skills and 
ability, as well as training and knowledge (Brazel and Agoglia 2007; Bauer and Estep 2014).8 I 
use the term “accuracy” to refer to the level of correctness, i.e., more accurate input is closer to 
being correct than less accurate input. This differs from justification strength as accuracy could 
be the same across levels of justification strength. Specialists (or experts) do not always provide 
accurate, unbiased input (e.g., Cain, Loewenstein, and Moore 2005, 2011; Koch and Schmidt 
2010). Thus, understanding auditors’ ability to discern between levels of input accuracy is 
important, especially given concerns related to overreliance and discounting of IT specialist 
input discussed above. Investigating input accuracy provides a benchmark for evaluating the 
weight auditors place on input. While justification strength could also provide a benchmark for 
comparing weight of input, differentiating between levels of justification strength may not 
require context specific knowledge and experience. The ability of auditors to determine input 
accuracy likely depends on the relevance of auditor knowledge and experience to the type of 
issue being evaluated (e.g., whether or not it contains an IT aspect). Given the influence of 
context related knowledge and experience in my setting, I build my hypotheses by ICFR issue 
type, first considering non-IT related ICFR issues and then IT-related. 
																																																								
7 Kadous et al. (2013) manipulate the strength of the social bond between the auditor and advisor via personal 
affiliation and potential for future interaction. For the stronger (weaker) social bond condition, the advisor, who is 
not a member of the audit team, is very much like (unlike) “someone who has helped you on work-related tasks in 
the past, someone you know well and like, and someone you expect to continue to interact with in the future” 
(Kadous et al. 2013). Future interaction with the advisor is very likely (unlikely). 
8 In fact, in a separate ongoing experiment with IT specialists, I find variation in the input IT specialists provide for 
the client ICFR cases used in this study. The input spans the range from inaccurate to accurate. 
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Non-IT related ICFR issues 
For non-IT related ICFR issues, auditors have relevant knowledge to help them critically 
evaluate input received. In fact, one might question why auditors would even contemplate input 
from IT specialists on non-IT related ICFR issues. As mentioned earlier, IT specialist work 
focuses on risks and controls in general and is not limited to IT risks and IT controls. IT 
specialists often perform the work for entire control processes on audits (Bauer and Estep 2016) 
and may help clients design control procedures (both IT and non-IT) on advisory engagements. 
IT specialists frequently provide input on all types of control issues as at a minimum, they will 
review the list of identified control deficiencies and related classification before signing off on 
the audit file. IT specialists may even be the audit team members identifying the non-IT related 
ICFR issues in the first place. Even with the relevance of auditor knowledge and experience on 
non-IT ICFR issues, IT specialists are a credible source of input on these types of issues. 
A stronger team identity increases the level of trust between the auditor and IT specialist 
(Haslam and Ellemers 2005) and as discussed above, the likelihood of seeing the IT specialist as 
a similar other, decreasing the salience of IT expertise. Gino et al. (2009) find individuals weight 
information more from a similar versus a dissimilar advisor when the judgment is about their 
own behavior. Individuals perceive advice from similar advisors as more informative about one’s 
own behavior. The context of Gino et al. (2009) focuses on the concept of self and behaviors 
related to the self, which is different from making audit-related judgments. However, I expect the 
theory to generalize to the context of my study; non-IT related ICFR issues will be perceived as 
both the auditor and IT specialist’s domain in the presence of a stronger team identity. Thus, 
auditors who share a stronger team identity with an IT specialist providing input will weight the 
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input relatively heavily regardless of input accuracy, despite having relevant knowledge to help 
evaluate input quality. 
Auditors with a weaker team identity, given the absence of trust to rely on, will likely use 
their relevant knowledge to appropriately place heavier weight on more (versus less) accurate 
input for non-IT related issues. In sum, I expect a smaller difference in input weighting between 
more and less accurate input for auditors with a stronger versus weaker team identity. My 
formally stated hypothesis follows. Refer to Figure 1, Panel A for a graphical depiction. 
Hypothesis 1: For non-IT related ICFR issues, auditors who share a stronger 
team identity with an IT specialist will weight input relatively heavily regardless 
of input accuracy, but auditors who share a weaker team identity will weight input 
relatively heavily if it is more accurate and relatively lightly if it is less accurate. 
 
IT-related ICFR issues 
 For IT-related issues, I expect auditors have less relevant knowledge to evaluate IT input 
(as compared to non-IT issues). One might expect auditors to defer to IT specialist judgment on 
IT-related issues given the overlap with the IT specialist’s area of expertise. However, this could 
depend on the level of team identity strength given the importance of expertise recognition 
(Einhorn et al. 1977; Libby et al. 1987; Harvey and Fischer 1997; Harvey et al. 2000) and the 
influence of team identity strength on perceptions of expertise. Auditors who share a weaker 
team identity better recognize the IT expertise of the IT specialist than auditors who share a 
stronger team identity. Gino et al. (2009) show that the weight placed on information received 
from an advisor in making a judgment depends on both similarity with the advisor and the target 
of the judgment. As discussed above, they find individuals weight information more from a 
similar versus a dissimilar advisor when the judgment is about their own behavior. They also 
find individuals weight information less from a similar versus dissimilar advisor when the target 
of the judgment is others’ behavior. This is again due to the perceived informativeness of the 
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advice – they perceive advice from dissimilar advisors as more informative about others’ 
behavior. Also, as mentioned above, tension exists as to whether the theory will generalize to the 
current context as Gino et al. (2009) focus on the concept of self and one’s own behavior, not a 
professional judgment context. 
In the current context, IT-related issues will be seen as the IT specialist’s domain for 
auditors sharing a weaker team identity. Auditors sharing a stronger team identity are less able to 
perceive that their similar other (the IT specialist) has salient expertise and thus, may view the 
IT-related issue as outside the domain of both the auditor and IT specialist. Therefore, auditors 
who share a weaker team identity (i.e., those for whom the IT specialist’s domain of expertise is 
more salient) will more heavily weight IT specialist input on IT-related issues. Hypothesis 2 
states my formal prediction. Refer to Figure 1, Panel B for a graphical depiction. 
Hypothesis 2: For IT-related ICFR issues, auditors with a weaker team identity 
will weight input received from an IT specialist more heavily than those with a 
stronger team identity. 
 
An implication of Hypotheses 1 and 2 is a two-way interaction between ICFR issue type 
and team identity. When evaluating non-IT related (IT-related) ICFR issues, auditors who share 
a stronger versus weaker team identity with the IT specialist will weight input received more 
(less). 
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
Participants 
 Practicing auditors were recruited for participation through the Center for Audit Quality 
and American Accounting Association Access to Audit Personnel program.9 A total of 101 
participants from the eight CAQ member firms completed the experimental instrument via the 
online survey tool Qualtrics.10 Participants are all senior-level auditors with 46.44 months of 
experience, on average.11 Seventy-seven participants are CPAs, none are CISAs (certified 
information systems auditors – a common certification for IT specialists), and participants spend 
35% of their time, on average, on SOX-related work.12 
Task and design 
My study employs a 2x2x(2x2) mixed design. I manipulate team identity and input 
quality between-subjects. Participants read and provide judgments on four client cases with 
ICFR issues adapted from Earley et al. (2008). Each case is for a different client and provides 
details regarding identified ICFR issues for a particular account or process. Participants were 
instructed to evaluate each case independently.13 The within-subjects manipulations occur via the 
client cases. Two cases contain no IT components and two contain IT components (Type: Non-IT 
versus IT-related), with a higher and lower issue severity case for each type (Severity: Higher 
versus Lower). For lower severity cases, the ICFR issues fall between a control deficiency and 																																																								
9 I revised my instrument prior to data collection based on comments from the eight CAQ firms that improved the 
information provided and validated the materials would seem reasonable to the auditor participants. 
10 Of the 101 participants, 79 are Big 4 auditors and 22 are non-Big 4 auditors. 
11 While managers and partners will likely perform the final internal control classifications due to reporting-related 
decisions, senior-level auditors often make the initial assessments and higher-level auditors are influenced by 
recommendations made by subordinates (Earley et al. 2008; Ricchiute 1999). Further, senior and manager level 
auditors are most likely to be interacting with IT specialists on audit engagements, therefore my participants are an 
appropriate group to investigate how auditors integrate input from IT specialists. 
12 Months of experience in public accounting is significantly higher for those in the stronger versus weaker team 
identity condition (p = 0.023). Percentage of time spent on auditing (consulting) is marginally lower (higher) for 
those in the more versus less accurate condition with p = 0.099 (p = 0.085). Inferences remain unchanged when 
controlling for these variables. 
13 The order of completing client cases was randomized across participants. 
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significant deficiency and for higher severity, between a significant deficiency and material 
weakness, by design (Earley et al. 2008). I include two levels of severity for robustness and to 
provide a more complete picture of the audit environment as the various levels of severity have 
different reporting consequences. My main interest, however, lies in examining the higher 
severity (i.e., more troublesome) issue cases.14 Therefore, I focus on these cases in my main 
results, and discuss results for the lower severity cases in supplemental tests. Refer to Appendix 
A for the experimental instrument.  
Auditors assume the role of the lead auditor on the client engagements and perform initial 
ICFR issue classifications for the four cases. The case then informs participants that the lead IT 
specialist on the engagements has reviewed the client cases and presents a description of the IT 
specialist. The between-subjects manipulation of stronger versus weaker team identity takes 
place within this description and is described in detail in the next section. I reinforce the 
manipulation via an open-ended question asking participants to consider what it would be like to 
work with this IT specialist and enter any thoughts that come to mind. 
After completing the open-ended questions regarding the IT specialist who will be 
providing input, the case informs participants that they will provide final judgments for each 
client case, this time receiving input from the IT specialist. I embed the between-subjects 
manipulation of input quality within the input received by providing more versus less accurate 
(i.e., higher versus lower quality) ICFR issue classification ratings from the IT specialist; the 
details of this manipulation are provided in the next section. 
																																																								
14 Further, my theory and predictions are more likely to hold for high severity issues given auditors’ asymmetric loss 
function and the potential for conservatism (Smith and Kida 1991) in the lower severity issues.  
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For each case, participants are reminded of their initial rating, receive IT specialist input 
(as described above), and perform final judgments.15 Following these assessments, participants 
complete task-related questions including a team identity manipulation check, and rating the 
quality of the IT specialist input, and the competence, trustworthiness, and objectivity of the IT 
specialist. I also collect additional post-test measures related to experience with and perspectives 
on IT specialists and controls, self-perceived IT expertise (Brazel and Agoglia 2007), and 
professional background information. Refer to Appendix A for the full experimental instrument 
Independent variables 
Team identity 
I induce a stronger versus weaker team identity between-subjects through three pieces of 
information about the IT specialist.16 First, the IT specialist particularly enjoys (does not 
particularly enjoy) thinking about financial statement audit issues as compared to 
advisory/consulting issues for the stronger (weaker) condition.17 As described earlier, in recent 
years, audit firms focus more heavily on advisory/consulting work and IT specialists serve dual 
roles, which likely influences the extent to which auditors share a team identity with IT 
specialists. Second, the IT specialist appears to want to be a helpful (only technically a) member 
of the team and tries to sit with (sits away from) the audit team while on-site for the stronger 
(weaker) condition. Bauer and Estep (2016) find sitting together or separate at client sites is a 
																																																								
15 The final judgments are performed in the same case order as the initial judgments. 
16 Sharing a social identity can increase perceptions of competence (Sidanius, Pratto, and Mitchell 1994). Thus, I 
attempt to control for this by including a statement regarding the competency of the IT specialist on both audit and 
advisory/consulting engagements indicating the IT specialist splits time between the two in both conditions. See 
Appendix A for the experimental instrument, including the full descriptions provided in each condition. 
17 One may ask, how would an auditor find out this type of information about an IT specialist in the real world? 
Given that auditors and IT specialists interact throughout the year on audit engagements and are sometimes on-site 
at the client together, auditors may learn the other engagements IT specialists work on and IT specialists’ views on 
the different types of engagements from casual and/or coordination discussions with the IT specialist. Bauer and 
Estep (2016) find that auditors are aware of the dual role of IT specialists as they express concerns regarding IT 
specialists’ consulting focus and prioritization impacting audit-related work.  
	20 
common factor associated with the strength of team identity. Finally, the participant views the IT 
specialist as a core (just obligatory) member of the team for stronger (weaker) team identity.18  
Prior empirical research on team identity has typically taken one of two approaches for 
investigating the team identity construct: 1) field study where team identity is measured (e.g., 
Van der Vegt and Bunderson 2005) or 2) a lab experiment using students where team identity is 
manipulated via visual (e.g., shared color of name tags), linguistic (e.g., use of them versus us), 
and/or common fate (e.g., experimental payout determined by team actions versus individual 
actions) (e.g., Kane 2010). In reference to the first possible approach, I chose to manipulate 
(rather than simply measure) perceptions of team identity in order to allow for strong causal 
inferences. The second approach was not an option as my participants are working professionals 
who would be completing the experimental materials during firm training on their own 
computers. Thus, I designed the above described team identity manipulation to elicit stronger 
versus weaker perceptions of team identity through activating team-related and integration 
concepts.19 
I purposefully avoided a manipulation similar to Kadous et al. (2013) (described in 
footnote 7) as I wanted to elicit team identity through team-related and integration concepts 
rather than a strong personal connection. Further, team identity is a multi-faceted construct that 
incorporates components such as cooperation, interaction, coordination, trust, etc. I strip away 
the interaction/personal connection piece with my manipulation and experimental design (as only 
one-way communication occurs from the IT specialist to the auditor) in order to provide a more 
narrow focus on other aspects of identity (e.g., perception of being part of the same team, trust). 
My manipulation design attempts to turn only one team identity “dial” as cleanly as possible. I 																																																								
18 The words “helpful”, “technically”, “core”, and “obligatory” appear in all conditions to keep word choice 
consistent. See Appendix A for the experimental instrument, including the detailed manipulations. 
19 As later analyses show, my manipulation was successful. 
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leave it to future research to investigate the effects of other aspects of team identity, including 
interaction and personal connections. 
Input quality 
I embed the input quality between-subjects manipulation of more versus less accurate 
input within the input provided by the IT specialists for each case. As described further below, 
participants rate ICFR issue severity for each case on an 11-point scale with labels of “Control 
deficiency” (1), “Significant deficiency” (6), and “Material weakness” (11). The same scale is 
used for the IT specialist input. For the two higher severity cases, participants in the more (less) 
accurate condition receive from the IT specialist a rating of 8.5 (3.5) and a classification that lies 
between a significant deficiency and material weakness (control deficiency and significant 
deficiency). For the two lower severity cases, I reverse these input ratings and classifications; 
participants in the more (less) accurate condition receive from the IT specialist a rating of 3.5 
(8.5) and a classification that lies between a control deficiency and significant deficiency 
(significant deficiency and material weakness). 20  Refer to Appendix A for experimental 
instrument, including the detailed between-subjects conditions. 
Dependent variables 
Participants perform two initial classification assessments for each case: 1) rating ICFR 
issue severity on an 11-point scale with labels of “Control deficiency” (1), “Significant 
deficiency” (6), and “Material weakness” (11) and 2) classifying the ICFR issue using a forced-
choice scale (Control deficiency, Significant deficiency, or Material weakness). Elicited final 
judgments include the same severity rating and ICFR issue classification judgments as in the 
																																																								
20 An 8.5 on the ICFR issue severity rating scale corresponds to an ICFR issue being at the midpoint of a significant 
deficiency and a material weakness. A 3.5 on the severity rating scale corresponds to an ICFR issue being at the 
midpoint of a control deficiency and a significant deficiency. I hold constant justification for the provided rating for 
each case across the input quality conditions. 
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initial judgments, as well as the rationale for judgments (open-ended), and the degree of changes 
desired to planned audit procedures due to the issue on an 11-point scale with endpoints of “No 
changes required” (0) and “Substantial changes” (10). Weight of input employed by auditors in 
the control severity judgment is the key dependent variable. Following prior literature, weight of 
input is calculated using the formula below (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006; Gino et al. 2009; Kadous 
et al. 2013): 
|Final rating – Initial rating| 
|IT specialist rating – Initial rating| 
 
Participants provided the initial and final ratings on the scales as described in the above 
paragraph. The IT specialist rating was provided to participants via the input quality 
manipulation, described in the previous section. This rating was either a 3.5 or an 8.5 depending 
on participant’s assigned input quality condition and case. These ratings coincide with the rating 
scale used by participants for their initial and final ratings. 
The weight of input measure is subject to limitations, thus careful analysis of the data is 
required (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006). First, when the initial rating equals the IT specialist rating, 
it returns an undefined value; this occurs for only three observations in my study (<1%) and 
following prior research (e.g., Yaniv 2004; Gino et al. 2009), I drop these observations from 
analysis. Second, the weight of input measure does not differentiate between judgments moving 
away from versus toward input. For example, for one observation the initial rating is 9, input is 
3.5, and the final rating is 10.5; the weight of input value is 0.273 suggesting higher weighting 
even though the individual is moving away from input. Moving away from input occurs for 23 
observations (~5%) and I adjust these weight of input values to 0. Third, the measure has a lower 
bound of zero, but no upper bound and when a final judgment overshoots the input received, the 
weight of input value is greater than 1. For example, for one observation the initial rating is 6, 
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input is 8.5, and the final judgment is 11, yielding a weight of input of 2. This occurs for 19 
observations (~5%) and I truncate these weight of input values to 1. Finally, an initial judgment 
is not provided for one observation; thus I drop this observation from analysis as the weight of 
input cannot be calculated. The number of dropped and adjusted observations does not 
significantly differ across between-subject conditions (Stronger-More Accurate: 11, Stronger-
Less Accurate: 12, Weaker-More Accurate: 12, Weaker-Less Accurate: 11; p = 1.000) or within-
subject cases (Higher-Non-IT: 9, Higher-IT: 7, Lower-Non-IT: 16, Lower-IT: 10; p = 0.7570) 
using Fisher’s exact test. 
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IV. RESULTS 
Manipulation and recall checks 
To test the effectiveness of my team identity manipulation, I use the Inclusion of Other in 
the Self scale (Aron, Aron, and Smollan 1992), a validated measure of identity (Tropp and 
Wright 2001) that has been used in prior identity-related audit research (Bauer 2015). I present 
participants with images of two overlapping circles labeled “Self” and “IT specialist.” Seven 
variations are presented, coded one through seven, ranging from no overlap (weakest identity – 
coded as 1) to near-complete overlap (strongest identity – coded as 7). Participants select the 
image that best describes how “your personal attributes, qualities, and values align or overlap 
with the attributes, qualities, and values of the IT specialist who provided the input to you.” 
Ratings are significantly higher for the stronger versus weaker team identity condition (4.57 
versus 3.64, t94 = 3.56, p < 0.001).21,22 I also ask participants a team-related recall check: “In 
terms of being a member of the team, you view the IT specialist who provided the input as:” that 
is rated on an 11-point scale with endpoints of “More obligatory than core” (-5) and “More core 
than obligatory” (5). Ratings are significantly higher for the stronger versus weaker team identity 
condition (1.85 versus -0.17, t99 = 4.71, p < 0.001). 
To verify the within-subjects case severity manipulation, I run a repeated measures 
ANOVA on the initial issue severity ratings (see Table 1). Only a main effect of Severity is 
significant (F96 = 13.34, p < 0.001) and the means for the two higher severity cases are rated 
higher than the lower severity cases (6.75 and 6.43 versus 5.67 and 5.86). 
																																																								
21 Five participants did not provide a response to this question.  
22 All reported p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
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Hypotheses tests 
Table 2, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the weight of input employed across 
conditions for each of the four client cases and Panel B lists the repeated measures ANOVA 
results. Figure 2 provides a graphical depiction of the means. As noted in the method section, I 
manipulate issue severity for robustness and my main interest lies in the higher severity cases. 
Therefore, I focus on these higher severity cases in the following main results analyses and 
discuss the lower severity cases in supplemental tests. 
Tests of Hypothesis 1: Non-IT related issue 
I predict in H1, for non-IT related ICFR issues, auditors who share a stronger team 
identity with an IT specialist will weight input relatively heavily regardless of input accuracy, 
but auditors who share a weaker team identity will weight input relatively heavily if it is more 
accurate and relatively lightly if it is less accurate. As a first test of H1, I compare the difference 
in weight of input of more and less accurate input for stronger versus weaker identity. The test I 
use is identical to the standard disordinal interaction. I expect: Stronger/More accurate – 
Stronger/Less accurate < Weaker/More accurate – Weaker/Less accurate. Table 3 reports the 
results. In support of H1, the test is significant (see (1) in Table 3; F1,93 = 3.23, p = 0.038, one-
tailed). 
I perform simple effects tests to further investigate H1. Table 3 presents the results.23 I 
find auditors with a weaker team identity weight input significantly heavier when receiving more 
versus less accurate input (see (2) in Table 3; p < 0.001, one-tailed). Auditors sharing a stronger 
identity with the IT specialist do not differentially weight across input accuracy conditions (see 
(3) in Table 3; p = 0.357). Auditors receiving less accurate input weight input differently 																																																								
23 While not reported in Table 3, I find a significant main effect of Input Quality, where auditors place more weight 
on more accurate input than less accurate input (F1,93 = 9.75, p = 0.002). 
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depending on strength of identity with stronger identity auditors placing heavier weight on input 
than weaker identity auditors (see (4) in Table 3; p = 0.032, one-tailed). Finally, auditors 
receiving more accurate input do not differentially weight across team identity conditions (see 
(5) in Table 3; p = 0.527).24 Thus, I find strong support for H1. 
Tests of Hypothesis 2: IT-related issue 
In H2, for IT-related ICFR issues, I predict auditors with a weaker team identity will 
weight input received from an IT specialist heavier than those with a stronger team identity. To 
test H2, I test for a main effect of team identity by comparing the weight of input for weaker 
versus stronger identity across input accuracy levels. Results indicate that for the IT-related issue 
case, auditors with a weaker identity weight input significantly more than auditors with a 
stronger identity (see (1) in Table 4; p = 0.031, one-tailed). Thus, H2 is supported.  
I also perform additional tests for the IT-related case; Table 4 reports the results.25 I 
compare the difference in weight of input of more and less accurate input for stronger versus 
weaker identity. The test is insignificant (see (2) in Table 4; F1,93 = 0.81, p = 0.371). However, 
the simple effects of more versus less accurate input within each identity condition provide 
evidence of stronger team identity auditors being less sensitive to input quality levels. Auditors 
with a stronger team identity do not differentially weight input across more and less accurate 
input (see (3) in Table 4; F1,93 = 1.41, p = 0.238). However, auditors with a weaker team identity 
place significantly heavier weight on more versus less accurate input (see (4) in Table 4; F1,93 = 
0.6.30, p = 0.014). In further support of weaker identity auditors using more appropriate input 
weighting, auditors with a weaker team identity place heavier weight on input than auditors with 																																																								
24 I also run a planned contrast with weights (1, 1, 1, -3) corresponding to (Stronger/More accurate, Stronger/Less 
accurate, Weaker/More accurate, Weaker/Less accurate). The planned contrast is significant: F1,93 = 11.01, p < 
0.001, one-tailed. 
25 While not reported in Table 4, I find a significant main effect of Input Quality, where auditors place more weight 
on more accurate input than less accurate input (F1,93 = 6.76, p = 0.011). 
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a stronger team identity when input is more accurate (see (5) in Table 4; F1,93 = 4.08, p = 0.046), 
but not less accurate (see (6) in Table 4; F1,93 = 0.47, p = 0.497). 
Summary 
As mentioned earlier, H1 and H2 imply an interaction between Team Identity and Issue 
Type. Per Table 2, Panel A, the mean weight of input for participants in the stronger team 
identity condition is higher than the weaker condition for non-IT related ICFR issues (0.40 
versus 0.31, respectively) and lower for IT-related ICFR issues (0.29 versus 0.37, respectively). 
This pattern is significant as indicated by the Team Identity*Issue Type interaction in Table 2, 
Panel B (p = 0.013). 
In summary, I find strong support for H1 and H2. I find evidence that auditors with a 
weaker team identity exhibit preferable weighting strategies for higher severity issues, the focus 
of these tests and the issues most concerning from an audit quality effectiveness perspective. 
Auditors with a weaker identity place heavier weight on more (versus less) accurate input and 
place heavier weight on input from IT specialists on issues in the area of their expertise 
compared to participants with a stronger team identity. 
Supplemental tests 
Lower Severity Issues 
The pattern of results for the lower severity cases shows directionally heavier weighting 
for less versus more accurate input (see Figure 2, Panel B). Recall from the design of the input 
accuracy manipulation, for lower severity cases, less accurate input reflects higher severity than 
more accurate input. Heavier weight on the less accurate input is consistent with auditor 
conservatism, or the tendency to give more attention to, and be more influenced by, negative 
information or outcomes; see Smith and Kida (1991) for a review of the extensive literature 
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supporting auditor conservatism. Thus, conservative auditors are more likely to anchor on input 
signaling high severity, which is the less accurate input for cases where the ICFR issue is truly 
low in severity. This conservatism tendency is significant, as indicated by the two-way 
interaction of Severity*Input Quality in the repeated measures ANOVA captured in Table 2, 
Panel B (p < 0.001). For the higher (lower) severity cases, auditors place heavier weight on input 
in the more (less) accurate input condition. In Tables 5 and 6, I report results of the same tests for 
H1 and H2 for the lower severity cases as I perform above for higher severity cases. 
For H1, the results in Table 5 provide evidence of a trust heuristic pattern (heavier 
weighting in stronger team identity condition regardless of input accuracy and differential 
weighting for the weaker team identity condition across input accuracy levels), but with heavier 
weighting in the less rather than more accurate condition for the weaker team identity. 
Specifically, auditors with a weaker team identity receiving less accurate input weight that input 
significantly heavier than weaker team identity auditors receiving more accurate input (see (2) in 
Table 5; p = 0.008, one-tailed). Auditors in the weaker/less accurate condition do not weight 
input significantly different from auditors who share a stronger team identity also receiving less 
accurate input (see (4) in Table 5; p = 0.378, one-tailed). Finally, for auditors receiving more 
accurate input, those with a weaker team identity weight input significantly lighter than auditors 
with a stronger team identity (see (5) in Table 5; p = 0.025). 
Table 6 reports results for H2 tests of the lower severity, IT-related issue. Results indicate 
that auditors do not weight input differently across identity conditions (see (1) in Table 6; p = 
0.498, one-tailed). Thus, H2 is not supported for the lower severity ICFR issues. 
In summary, the non-IT related lower severity case shows continued presence of a trust 
heuristic for auditors with a stronger team identity. However, auditor tendency for conservatism 
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results in inappropriately placing heavier weight on less versus more accurate input. Arguably, 
this inappropriate heavier weight creates an efficiency rather than effectiveness problem. For the 
lower severity IT-related issue, the strength of team identity did not influence auditor weight on 
IT specialist input. 
Outcome judgments 
Correctness of classification. To verify participants attend to the differential input from 
IT specialists across input quality conditions, I test for differences in the final ICFR 
classifications provided. Regulator concerns of overreliance (PCAOB 2012, 2015) and recent 
interview-based literature providing evidence of overreliance on, and trust in, audit specialists 
(Griffith et al. 2014; Boritz et al. 2015) support the idea that these classifications will be 
influenced by IT specialist input. However, IT specialist input may not impact auditor 
classifications as recent experimental work on audit specialists shows that incorporating 
information from specialists depends on whether auditors are motivated to incorporate cues from 
specialists (Griffith 2015b). Further, IT specialists express concerns that auditors are ignoring the 
input they provide on audit engagements (Bauer and Estep 2016). However, given the influence 
of advisor input evident in prior auditing studies in both formal (Ng and Shankar 2010; Gold, 
Knechel, and Wallage 2012) and informal (Kadous et al. 2013) advice settings, if attended to, I 
expect auditor classifications of ICFR issues will be influenced by the IT specialist input 
received. 
I create a binary variable to capture whether the final ICFR issue classification provided 
is correct. For the two higher (lower) severity cases, a classification of significant deficiency or 
material weakness (control deficiency or significant deficiency) is correct; a classification of 
control deficiency (material weakness) is incorrect. Table 7, Panel A captures the percentage of 
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correct classifications across cases. The percentage correct is higher in the more versus less 
accurate condition for all cases. To test for a significant difference in correctness between more 
versus less accurate input conditions, I run a repeated measures generalized linear model with the 
correctness of the ICFR classification as the dependent variable. As documented in Table 7, 
Panel B, a significant main effect of accuracy is present (p < 0.001) providing support for more 
(less) accurate input resulting in more (less) correct ICFR issue classifications.26 The marginally 
significant interaction of Severity*Input Quality is due to a larger difference in correct 
classifications between the more and less accurate input quality conditions for higher versus 
lower severity cases. The difference in the percentage of correct classifications between more 
and less accurate conditions is 25% across the higher severity cases (95% - 70%) and 10% across 
the lower severity cases (87% - 77%). This provides evidence the improvement in ICFR 
classifications is greater for higher severity cases. Overall, this analysis shows participants attend 
to the differential information received across input quality conditions as their final judgments 
significantly differ.  
Final severity rating. In this section, I investigate the influence of my between- and 
within-subjects variables on the final severity ratings provided by participants. Table 8, Panel A 
provides the descriptive statistics of the final severity ratings for each case by condition. I 
perform a repeated measures ANOVA with the final ICFR issue severity rating as the dependent 
variable (see Table 8, Panel B). Given the within-subjects manipulation of severity, higher 
(lower) ratings for higher (lower) severity cases are more accurate. Similar to the analysis on 
correct classifications, I find a significant Severity*Input Quality interaction (F1, 97 = 50.26, p < 
0.001). Final ICFR issue severity ratings are higher (lower) for higher severity cases when 																																																								
26 I also ran logit regressions and found similar results regarding a main effect of input quality and no other 
significant effects. 
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auditors are provided more (less) accurate input. For lower severity cases, ratings are lower 
(higher) for more (less) accurate input.27  
Panels C, D, E, and F in Table 8 summarize the results of main and simple effects by 
case. For the higher severity-non-IT related case (Table 8, Panel C), final severity ratings are 
significantly higher for the more versus less accurate condition (see (2); F1, 97 = 11.22, p = 
0.001). Consistent with stronger team identity auditors weighting input similarly across more and 
less accurate input, final severity judgments are significantly different across more and less 
accurate input (see (4); F1, 97 = 10.39, p = 0.002). Stronger-more accurate condition ratings are 
higher than stronger-less accurate condition ratings. Consistent with weaker team identity 
auditors differentially weighting input across more and less accurate input, final severity 
judgments do not significantly differ across more and less accurate input (see (5); F1, 97 = 2.32, p 
= 0.131). 
For the higher severity-IT related case (Table 8, Panel D), final severity ratings are 
significantly higher for the more versus less accurate condition (see (2); F1, 97 = 19.74, p < 
0.001). Final severity judgments are significantly different across more and less accurate input 
for both stronger (see (4); F1, 97 = 9.94, p = 0.002) and weaker (see (5); F1, 97 = 9.80, p = 0.002) 
team identity auditors. Auditors in the more accurate conditions rate the issue higher than 
auditors in the less accurate condition.  
For the lower severity-non-IT related case (Table 8, Panel E), final severity ratings are 
significantly higher for the less versus more accurate condition (see (2); F1, 97 = 14.58, p < 
0.001). Consistent with stronger team identity auditors weighting input similarly across more and 
less accurate input, final severity judgments are significantly different across more and less 
accurate input (see (4); F1, 97 = 15.59, p < 0.001). Stronger-less accurate condition ratings are 																																																								
27 Inferences are unchanged when controlling for initial ICFR severity rating judgments 
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higher than stronger-more accurate condition ratings. Consistent with weaker team identity 
differentially weighting input across more and less accurate input, final severity judgments do 
not significantly differ across more and less accurate input (see (5); F1, 97 = 2.16, p = 0.145). 
Additionally (and again consistent with the weight of input results), the difference in final 
severity ratings of more and less accurate input conditions is larger for stronger versus weaker 
team identity auditors at a marginally significant level (see (3); F1, 97 = 2.99, p = 0.087). 
For the lower severity-IT-related case (Table 8, Panel F), final severity ratings are 
significantly higher for the less versus more accurate condition (see (2); F1, 97 = 15.98, p < 
0.001). Final severity judgments are significantly different across more and less accurate input 
for both stronger (see (4); F1, 97 = 12.20, p = 0.001) and weaker (see (5); F1, 97 = 4.70, p = 0.033) 
team identity auditors. Auditors in the less accurate conditions rate the issue higher than auditors 
in the more accurate condition. 
Perceptions of IT specialist and input received 
I collected measures related to participants’ perceptions of the IT specialist and the input 
received. I elicited overall quality of the IT specialist input on an 11-point scale with endpoints 
of “Very low quality” (0) and “Very high quality” (10), the competence (11-point scale with 
endpoints “Very low competence” and “Very high competence”), objectivity (11-point scale 
with endpoints “Not at all objective” and “Extremely objective”), and trustworthiness (11-point 
scale with endpoints “Not at all trustworthy” and “Extremely trustworthy”) of the IT specialist 
providing the input, and whether the participant would want to work with the IT specialist again 
on an 11-point scale with endpoints of “Definitely not” (-5) and “Definitely” (5). I run separate 
ANOVAs (see Table 9, Panels A through E) with each of these measures as the dependent 
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variable and find a significant main effect of team identity (p < 0.02) on all five measures.28 
Perceptions of the IT specialist and the IT specialist’s input are significantly more favorable for 
the stronger versus weaker team identity condition. Thus, these results provide support for the 
increased level of trust when a stronger team identity is present. Further, these results are 
interesting to consider because, despite having a significantly more favorable impression of the 
IT specialist, auditors who share a stronger team identity with an IT specialist do not weight 
input significantly higher overall than auditors who share a weaker team identity. 
Open-ended responses 
Identity manipulation. After reading the description of the IT specialist providing input 
(where the team identity manipulation took place), participants were asked the following open-
ended question: “You may or may not have not worked with an IT specialist quite like this in the 
past, but please take a minute to think about what it would be like to work with this person. What 
are some thoughts that come to mind? Please type your thoughts below and again, take only a 
minute to do this.”29 The coding categories (described in Table 10) aim to capture what concepts 
were activated for participants by the team identity manipulation and what aspects of the 
manipulation stood out. Additionally, an alternative explanation for H2 results, regarding 
auditors with a weaker team identity placing heavier weight on IT specialist input than auditors 
with a stronger team identity, is that auditors with a weaker team identity perceive the IT 
specialist to be more competent about IT-related matters than auditors with a stronger team 
identity, due to the team identity manipulation.30 A coder with five years of Big 4 audit 
																																																								
28 Reported results are robust to controlling for these factors. 
29 The team identity manipulation took place before the input quality manipulations, therefore analyses are only 
required for the team identity conditions. 
30 While this explanation is unlikely as auditors with a stronger team identity rated the IT specialist as more 
competent overall than auditors with a weaker team identity, perceptions of IT-related competence could have 
differed. 
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experience and I coded responses; both coders were blind to experimental conditions. Initial 
intercoder agreement was 91.32%, with a Kappa of 0.693 (p < 0.001 indicating agreement better 
than chance). We reconciled all items of disagreement. 
Auditors with a stronger team identity are significantly more likely to mention the IT 
specialists’ IT-related competence than auditors with a weaker team identity (16 versus one, 
respectively, p < 0.001).31 Participants are more likely to mention effectiveness concerns related 
to the IT specialist and IT specialist’s work in the weaker versus stronger team identity condition 
(15 versus one, respectively, p < 0.001). Thus, the alternative explanation posed above is 
unlikely. Further, as the goal of the team identity manipulation was to prompt team-related 
concepts such as integration, a large number of participants mention these in both team identity 
conditions (Stronger: 21 and Weaker: 23, p = 0.625). 
More participant responses are positive for stronger versus weaker team identity 
conditions (39 versus 5, respectively, p < 0.001) and more responses are negative for weaker 
versus stronger (29 versus 1, respectively, p < 0.001). No differences were noted across the team 
identity conditions in terms of mentioning specific aspects of the manipulation: IT specialist 
preference for auditing or consulting (Stronger: 11 versus Weaker: 10, p = 0.846), IT specialist 
experience with both auditing and advisory engagements (Stronger: five versus Weaker: five, p = 
0.974), whether the IT specialist was a helpful member of the team or only technically a member 
(Stronger: six versus Weaker: four, p = 0.527), whether or not the IT specialist sits with the audit 
																																																								
31 There is no difference across conditions in mentioning the IT specialists’ audit-related or general competence; see 
Table 10. 
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team (Stronger: 1 versus Weaker: 4, p = 0.162), and whether the IT specialist is a core or 
obligatory member of the team (Stronger: four versus Weaker: four p = 0.977).32  
Final judgment rationale. Following the completion of the final severity rating and 
forced choice classification in each case, participants were asked to “Please document the 
rationale for the judgment and classification you just completed on the previous page.” Table 11 
captures the results of coding those responses and related analyses. The coding categories 
(described in Table 11) aim to capture whether the theory-based expectation regarding the 
increased salience of the IT specialists’ expertise for auditors in the weaker team identity 
condition holds. I expect that auditors sharing a weaker team identity with the IT specialist 
providing input will be more likely to mention the IT specialist in their rationale and be more 
likely to notice the IT aspects of the cases. A coder with five years of Big 4 audit experience and 
I coded responses; both coders were blind to experimental conditions. Initial intercoder 
agreement was 92.96%, with a Kappa of 0.760 (p < 0.001 indicating agreement better than 
chance). We reconciled all items of disagreement. 
Results of coding are consistent with my theory-based expectations. Auditors with a 
weaker team identity are more likely to mention the IT aspects of the cases than auditors with a 
stronger team identity; this difference is marginally significant (Table 11, Panel A; p = 0.055, 
one-tailed).33 Further, auditors with a weaker team identity are more likely to mention the IT 
specialist in their rationale responses than auditors with a stronger team identity (Table 11, Panel 
B; p = 0.043, one-tailed).34 A significant Type*Input Quality interaction is also present (p = 																																																								
32 There was no difference across team identity conditions in the number of participants who did not mention any of 
the code categories (Stronger: three versus Weaker: five, p = 0.444) nor the length of response (Mean for stronger: 
252.98 versus Mean for weaker: 264.72, t = -0.40, p = 0.693). 
33 I control for the total length of the rational responses as participants who wrote more would be more likely to 
mention specific case facts, including any IT aspects. 
34 I control for the total length of rational responses as participants who wrote more would be more likely to mention 
the IT specialist input. 
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0.047); auditors are most likely to mention the IT specialist when the input they receive is more 
accurate and the case is IT-related. 
We also coded for whether the participants mention agreeing or disagreeing with the IT 
specialist. Table 11, Panel C captures the results of mentioning agreement with the IT specialist. 
A significant Severity*Input Quality interaction is present (p = 0.010); auditors are most likely to 
mention agreement with the IT specialist in the higher severity cases when input is more 
accurate. Table 11, Panel D captures the results of mentioning disagreement with the IT 
specialist. While not significant  (p = 0.106), auditors in the weaker team identity condition are 
the more likely to mention disagreement than auditors in the stronger team identity. Auditors in 
the less accurate condition are (at a marginally significant level, p = 0.084) more likely to 
disagree than auditors in the more accurate condition; this appears to be driven by those in the 
weaker-less accurate condition. A significant Severity*Input Quality interaction is present (p = 
0.050), where auditors are more likely to disagree in the higher severity cases when input is less 
accurate. Again, this appears to be driven by auditors in the weaker-less accurate condition. 
Table 11, Panel E captures the descriptive statistics and repeated measures ANOVA for 
the number of case facts mentioned by participants in their rationale responses.35 A marginally 
significant Input Quality*Team Identity interaction exists (p = 0.090); in both the stronger and 
weaker team identity conditions, auditors mention more case facts when the IT specialist input is 
more versus less accurate. The difference between number of case facts in more and less accurate 
conditions is larger for auditors in the weaker versus stronger team identity condition. Table 11, 
Panel F captures the descriptive statistics and repeated measures ANOVA for the length of the 
																																																								
35 I control for the total length of the rational responses as participants who wrote more would be more likely to 
mention a higher number of case facts. 
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rationale responses (i.e., the character count of the response). No significant differences are 
noted across the between- or within-subjects variables. 
Systematic versus heuristic processing 
The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo 1986) is a 
potentially relevant mechanism for investigating and describing the differences in how auditors 
with different levels of team identity strength process information received from IT specialists. 
Prompting a weaker team identity could result in high elaboration likelihood due to auditors 
having high motivation to process the input information received. A stronger team identity could 
result in low elaboration likelihood and a reliance on simple cues (such as trust) to make 
decisions. Some of the results described for stronger versus weaker team identity conditions is 
consistent with this heuristic versus systematic processing, respectively. For example, the lower 
sensitivity of auditors with a stronger team identity to input quality levels is consistent with 
heuristic processing of the IT specialist input (described by Kadous et al. (2013) as the trust 
heuristic). The differentiation between input quality levels by weaker team identity auditors is 
consistent with more systematic processing. The open-ended responses, however, do not provide 
consistent (or inconsistent) evidence of different elaboration levels. The number of case facts 
participants mention in the judgment rationale responses does not differ, nor does the length of 
responses, across team identity conditions. This could be due to the absence of differential 
elaboration or due to the design of the open-ended rationale question being unable to capture 
differences in elaboration. Prior accounting research on the Elaboration Likelihood Model has 
used surprise free recall exercises to purposefully measure whether differences in elaboration is 
present across conditions by measuring differences in case facts recalled, links made between 
cases facts, and links to other knowledge (e.g., Griffith 2015b). As the rationale responses were 
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not my main dependent variable of interest, I did not design the question with the goal of 
measuring these items. Future research should investigate whether the strength of team identity 
between auditors and specialists impacts the level of elaboration auditors employ when 
processing evidence received from specialists. 
Decision strategies 
 Table 12 summarizes the results of identifying participant decision strategy based on 
initial judgment, final judgment, and IT specialist input received. This analysis provides a more 
nuanced view into how the participants arrived at their final judgments, beyond the weight of 
input measure. Table 12, Panel B provides evidence of weaker team identity auditors using a 
better decision strategy than stronger team identity auditors related to when participants matched 
the IT specialist input in their final judgment. A significant Input Quality*Team Identity 
interaction is present (p = 0.028), where weaker team identity auditors more often match input 
when it is more versus less accurate, while stronger team identity auditors more often match 
input when it is less versus more accurate. Further, a significant Type*Team Identity interaction 
is present, where stronger team identity auditors are more likely match IT specialist input in non-
IT related issues and weaker team identity auditors are more likely to match input in the IT-
related issues. 
Evidence related to other decision strategies supports the tendency for auditors to exhibit 
conservatism, as discussed earlier. Table 12, Panel A summaries the results related to instances 
when participants moved from their initial judgments away from IT specialist input to arrive at 
their final judgments. A significant Severity*Input Quality interaction exists (p = 0.020), where 
auditors more frequently move away from input in the higher severity cases when input is less 
accurate and in the lower severity cases when input is more accurate. The input provided in the 
	39 
higher severity-less accurate and lower severity-more accurate indicate the issue is of lower 
severity. Similarly, in Table 12, Panel C, participants are most likely to stay with their initial 
judgments (i.e., final judgment is equal to initial judgment) when input is less accurate in the 
higher severity cases and more accurate in the lower severity cases.36 Again, these are the 
conditions where input indicates the issue is less severe. Finally, Table 12, Panel D provides 
evidence of auditors being more likely to move toward input (but not average; the decision 
strategy of averaging is discussed next) that indicates an issue is of high severity. Participants 
most frequently moved from initial judgments toward the IT specialist input to arrive at final 
judgments when input is more accurate in the higher severity cases and less accurate in the lower 
severity cases. These are the conditions where input indicates the issue is of high severity. Taken 
together, the patterns of these decision strategies across the conditions and cases provides strong 
evidence of the tendency for auditor conservatism, or a desire to avoid negative audit outcomes 
that might result from stating an issue is of low severity and subsequently discovering the issue 
actually of high severity. 
Table 12, Panel E provides the results related to instances when participants averaged 
their initial judgment and the IT specialist input to arrive at their final judgment. Averaging has 
been noted as a best practice approach for incorporating input into one’s judgments (regardless 
of the quality or certainty of the input) to reach the highest quality decisions across a wide 
variety of decision contexts (Soll and Larrick 2009). A marginally significant Type*Input 
Quality interaction (p = 0.073) exists; participants are most likely to average when the case is IT-
related and they receive more accurate input. Participants are least likely to average when the 
																																																								
36 A marginally significant four-way Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity interaction is present (p = 0.077) 
for the decision strategy of not changing from initial judgment. This indicates different patterns exist in terms of the 
frequency off auditors not changing from their initial judgment for the between-subjects conditions (Input Quality x 
Team Identity) across the four client cases. 
	40 
case is IT-related and they receive less accurate input. Participants are equally likely to average 
across input quality conditions when the case is not IT-related. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In today’s audit ecology, audits teams made up of auditors and specialists work together 
to complete the required audit procedures and determine appropriate audit conclusions. To 
improve our understanding of the audit teaming environment, I investigate how auditors 
integrate input received from IT specialists (Trotman et al. 2015). Drawing on social identity 
theory, expertise and advice literatures, I specifically examine the extent to which auditors 
weight input received from an IT specialist on ICFR issue classification judgments and how the 
strength of team identity influences the weight placed on input. I predict and find auditors who 
share a weaker team identity place heavier weight on more (versus less) accurate input and 
auditors who share a stronger team identity with an IT specialist weight input relatively heavily 
regardless of input accuracy for non-IT related ICFR issues. For IT-related issues, auditors who 
share a weaker team identity with the IT specialist providing input weight the input received 
heavier than auditors who share a stronger team identity. 
 Regulators and recent research highlight concerns regarding overreliance on specialist 
areas and ineffective communication and coordination between auditors and IT specialists. My 
dissertation investigates a potential underlying cause of these issues – the way in which auditors 
integrate input from IT specialists. Thus, I bridge the lines of research on audit specialists (e.g., 
Griffith 2015a, 2015b; Griffith et al. 2014; Bauer and Estep 2014, 2016; Boritz et al. 2015) and 
advice taking in auditing (e.g., Ng and Shankar 2010; Gold, Knechel, and Wallage 2012; Kadous 
et al. 2013). 
I find evidence of benefits to auditors sharing a weaker team identity with audit 
specialists; that is, auditors weight input from the specialist more heavily (compared to those 
auditors with a stronger team identity) when the issue overlaps with the domain of the 
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specialist’s expertise. Auditors with a weaker team identity appropriately differentiate between 
levels of input quality for more severe issues as auditors who share a stronger team identity with 
the IT specialist providing input are less sensitive to levels of input quality. However, I also find 
evidence of a preference for conservatism, indicating auditors with a weaker team identity are 
not necessarily always differentiating based on the level of input quality, but rather employing a 
conservative heuristic. This heuristic can still be viewed as functional from an effectiveness 
perspective, as it only results in an inappropriate weighting scheme in the lower severity issues. 
An interesting implication to consider regarding the downside of a stronger team identity 
between auditors and IT specialists is that a stronger team identity may be more likely to form on 
clients with economic importance (in general and to the audit firm) as those auditors and IT 
specialists likely spend more time together on site at the client. However, a stronger team 
identity may be more likely to form on smaller clients due to easier communication on smaller 
teams and a more cohesive feel among audit team members (Bauer and Estep 2016). Further, a 
large literature exists supporting the positive benefits of a stronger team identity such as 
increased cooperation, loyalty, and information sharing. Therefore, encouraging a weaker team 
identity between auditors and IT specialists may result in sacrificing these benefits. My 
dissertation motivates future research to find ways to capitalize on these benefits of stronger 
team identity and the input integration benefits of a weaker team identity identified in my study. 
Further, future research should investigate the implications of team identity on interactions 
between auditors and other specialists, such as tax or valuation, especially as recent research 
highlights ongoing issues with valuation specialists on audit engagements (Griffith et al. 2014). 
Future research can also consider the implications of team and shared identities with specialists 
outside of the firm. 
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The implications as well as limitations of my dissertation provide fruitful avenues for 
future research. While my experimental design allows for control to make causal inferences, the 
lack of interaction between auditors and IT specialists could alter the impact of stronger and 
weaker team identities the way auditors and IT specialists work together. Further, the 
participants made their ICFR assessment judgments in isolation, whereas in the audit 
environment, these decisions would be made in a hierarchical team setting (e.g., Chen, Trotman, 
and Zhou 2015). Future research should investigate whether these interpersonal interactions 
influence the way in which audit specialist input is integrated into audit team decisions, as well 
as whether a stronger team identity could be more beneficial in the auditor-specialist setting in 
the presence of interpersonal interaction for other aspects of teaming behavior, such as 
information sharing.  
While I investigate the effects of a shared team identity between auditors and IT 
specialists, other relevant social identities exist, such as client identity, organizational identity, 
and professional identity (Bamber and Iyer 2002, 2007; Suddaby et al. 2009; Bauer 2015). 
Depending on the strength and salience of these various identities (Bauer 2015), interactions 
could occur that influence how auditors differentially weight input from specialists, especially 
when the input is consistent or inconsistent with client preferences. Finally, other contextual 
features of the audit environment, such as time pressure, budget pressure, or client importance, 
could influence how willing auditors are to listen to audit specialists. Future research can 
investigate these potential interacting variables to further improve our understanding of how 
auditors incorporate input from audit specialists. 
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Figure 2 
Results Graphs 
 
Panel A: Higher Severity Casesa 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
Results Graphs 
 
Panel B: Lower Severity Casesa 
 
 
 
 
 
a Refer to Table 1 for variable descriptions. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Initial Severity Rating 
 
Panel B: Repeated measures ANOVAa 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 0.55 1 0.55 0.06 0.805 
Team identity 6.17 1 6.17 0.69 0.410 
Input Quality*Team Identity 8.44 1 8.44 0.94 0.336 
Error 865.59 96 9.02 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity 71.17 1 71.17 13.34 <0.001 
Severity*Input Quality 2.84 1 2.84 0.53 0.468 
Severity*Team Identity <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.983 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.52 1 9.52 1.78 0.185 
Error 512.32 96 5.34 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type 0.35 1 0.35 0.09 0.768 
Type*Input Quality 0.02 1 0.02 0.01 0.940 
Type*Team Identity 1.81 1 1.81 0.45 0.506 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 1.55 1 1.55 0.38 0.537 
Error 389.27 96 4.06 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 10.03 1 10.03 1.78 0.186 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 9.81 1 9.81 1.74 0.190 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 6.75 1 6.75 1.20 0.277 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 3.04 1 3.04 0.54 0.465 
Error 541.77 96 5.64     
 
a Input Quality and Team Identity are manipulated at two levels each between-subjects, more versus less accurate 
and stronger versus weaker, respectively. Severity and Type are manipulated at two levels each within-subjects, 
higher versus lower and non-IT versus IT-related issue, via the four client cases. For the dependent variable, initial 
severity rating, participants provided judgments on an 11-point scale with labels of “Control deficiency” (1), 
“Significant deficiency” (6), and “Material weakness” (11). All p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Weight of Input from IT Specialist 
 
Panel B: Repeated measures ANOVAa 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 0.08 1 0.08 0.45 0.505 
Team identity 0.02 1 0.02 0.14 0.709 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.06 1 0.06 0.32 0.574 
Error 15.95 93 0.17 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.951 
Severity*Input Quality 2.53 1 2.53 23.64 <0.001 
Severity*Team Identity 0.23 1 0.23 2.15 0.146 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.42 1 0.42 3.88 0.052 
Error 9.95 93 0.11 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type 0.04 1 0.04 0.44 0.507 
Type*Input Quality 0.02 1 0.02 0.17 0.684 
Type*Team Identity 0.60 1 0.60 6.37 0.013 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.02 1 0.02 0.17 0.683 
Error 8.78 93 0.09 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 0.02 1 0.02 0.28 0.600 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 0.08 1 0.08 1.05 0.308 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 0.02 1 0.02 0.29 0.594 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.17 1 0.17 2.29 0.133 
Error 6.84 93 0.07     
 
a Input Quality and Team Identity are manipulated at two levels each between-subjects, more versus less accurate 
and stronger versus weaker, respectively. Severity and Type are manipulated at two levels each within-subjects, 
higher versus lower and non-IT versus IT-related issue, via the four client cases. The dependent variable, weight of 
input, is calculated via the following formula: 
|Final rating – Initial rating| 
|IT specialist rating – Initial rating| 
where participants provide initial and final rating judgments on an 11-point scale with labels of “Control deficiency” 
(1), “Significant deficiency” (6), and “Material weakness” (11). Refer to Table 1 for independent variable 
descriptions. All p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted.  
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Table 3 
Higher Severity Case: Tests of H1 – Non-IT related Issue 
 
Dependent variable: Weight of Input from IT Specialista 
            
Expectation SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
(1) [Stronger/More accurate – Stronger/Less accurate] < 
      [Weaker/More accurate – Weaker/Less accurate] b 0.34 1 0.34 3.23 0.038 
Error 9.73 93 0.11   
(2) Weaker/More accurate > Weaker/Less accurate b 1.30 1 1.30 12.45 <0.001 
Error 9.73 93 0.11   
(3) Stronger/More accurate = Stronger/Less accurate 0.09 1 0.09 0.86 0.357 
Error 9.73 93 0.11   
(4) Stronger/Less accurate > Weaker/Less accurate b 0.37 1 0.37 3.52 0.032 
Error 9.73 93 0.11   
(5) Stronger/More accurate = Weaker/More accurate 0.04 1 0.04 0.40 0.527 
Error 9.73 93 0.11     
 
a The dependent variable, weight of input, is calculated via the following formula: 
|Final rating – Initial rating| 
|IT specialist rating – Initial rating| 
where participants provide initial and final rating judgments on an 11-point scale with labels of “Control deficiency” 
(1), “Significant deficiency” (6), and “Material weakness” (11). Refer to Table 1 for independent variable 
descriptions. Hypothesis tests are performed based on repeated measures ANOVA captured in Table 2, Panel B. All 
p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
b One-tailed p-value. 
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Table 4 
Higher Severity Case: Tests of H2 – IT-related Issue 
 
Dependent variable: Weight of Input from IT Specialista 
            
Expectation SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
(1) Weaker > Stronger b 0.39 1 0.39 3.56 0.031 
Error 10.12 93 0.11     
 
            
Additional tests SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
(2) [Stronger/More accurate – Stronger/Less accurate] 
       vs. [Weaker/More accurate – Weaker/Less accurate] 0.09 1 0.09 0.81 0.371 
Error 10.12 93 0.11   
(3) Stronger/More accurate vs. Stronger/Less accurate 0.15 1 0.15 1.41 0.238 
Error 10.12 93 0.11   
(4) Weaker/More accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 0.69 1 0.69 6.30 0.014 
Error 10.12 93 0.11   
(5) Stronger/More accurate vs. Weaker/More accurate 0.44 1 0.44 4.08 0.046 
Error 10.12 93 0.11   
(6) Stronger/Less accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 0.05 1 0.05 0.47 0.497 
Error 10.12 93 0.11   
 
a The dependent variable, weight of input, is calculated via the following formula: 
|Final rating – Initial rating| 
|IT specialist rating – Initial rating| 
where participants provide initial and final rating judgments on an 11-point scale with labels of “Control deficiency” 
(1), “Significant deficiency” (6), and “Material weakness” (11). Refer to Table 1 for independent variable 
descriptions. Hypothesis tests are performed based on repeated measures ANOVA captured in Table 2, Panel B. All 
p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
b One-tailed p-value.  
	60 
Table 5 
Lower Severity Case: Tests of H1 – Non-IT related Issue 
 
Dependent variable: Weight of Input from IT Specialista 
            
Expectation SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
(1) [Stronger/More accurate – Stronger/Less accurate] < 
           [Weaker/More accurate – Weaker/Less accurate] b 0.22 1 0.22 1.82 0.091 
Error 11.47 93 0.12   
(2) Weaker/More accurate > Weaker/Less accurate 0.91 1 0.91 7.39 0.008c 
Error 11.47 93 0.12   
(3) Stronger/More accurate = Stronger/Less accurate 0.07 1 0.07 0.58 0.447 
Error 11.47 93 0.12   
(4) Stronger/Less accurate > Weaker/Less accurate b 0.01 1 0.01 0.10 0.378 
Error 11.47 93 0.12   
(5) Stronger/More accurate = Weaker/More accurate 0.64 1 0.64 5.21 0.025 
Error 11.47 93 0.12     
 
a The dependent variable, weight of input, is calculated via the following formula: 
|Final rating – Initial rating| 
|IT specialist rating – Initial rating| 
where participants provide initial and final rating judgments on an 11-point scale with labels of “Control deficiency” 
(1), “Significant deficiency” (6), and “Material weakness” (11). Refer to Table 1 for independent variable 
descriptions. Hypothesis tests are performed based on repeated measures ANOVA captured in Table 2, Panel B. All 
p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
b One-tailed p-value. 
c While significant, this difference is not in the expected direction as Weaker/More accurate < Weaker/Less accurate. 
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Table 6 
Lower Severity Case: Tests of H2 – IT-related Issue 
 
Dependent variable: Weight of Input from IT Specialista 
            
Expectation SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
(1) Weaker > Stronger b <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.498 
Error 10.19 93 0.11     
 
            
Additional tests SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
(2) [Stronger/More accurate – Stronger/Less accurate] 
       vs. [Weaker/More accurate – Weaker/Less accurate] 0.01 1 0.01 0.04 0.850 
Error 10.19 93 0.11   
(3) Stronger/More accurate vs. Stronger/Less accurate 0.13 1 0.13 1.19 0.278 
Error 10.19 93 0.11   
(4) Weaker/More accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 0.08 1 0.08 0.72 0.398 
Error 10.19 93 0.11   
(5) Stronger/More accurate vs. Weaker/More accurate 0.01 1 0.01 0.02 0.894 
Error 10.19 93 0.11   
(6) Stronger/Less accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 0.01 1 0.01 0.02 0.893 
Error 10.19 93 0.11   
 
a The dependent variable, weight of input, is calculated via the following formula: 
|Final rating – Initial rating| 
|IT specialist rating – Initial rating| 
where participants provide initial and final rating judgments on an 11-point scale with labels of “Control deficiency” 
(1), “Significant deficiency” (6), and “Material weakness” (11). Refer to Table 1 for independent variable 
descriptions. Hypothesis tests are performed based on repeated measures ANOVA captured in Table 2, Panel B. All 
p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
b One-tailed p-value. 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Correctness of ICFR Issue Classification 
 
Panel B: Repeated measures Generalized Linear Modela 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 3.11 1 3.11 19.18 <0.001 
Team identity <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.970 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.04 0.850 
Error 15.74 97 0.16 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity <0.01 1 <0.01 0.02 0.900 
Severity*Input Quality 0.62 1 0.62 3.74 0.056 
Severity*Team Identity 0.07 1 0.07 0.39 0.532 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.15 1 0.15 0.92 0.340 
Error 16.13 97 0.17 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type 0.10 1 0.10 0.82 0.367 
Type*Input Quality 0.05 1 0.05 0.40 0.530 
Type*Team Identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.12 0.732 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.05 1 0.05 0.38 0.537 
Error 11.81 97 0.12 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 0.01 1 0.01 0.11 0.741 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 0.04 1 0.04 0.37 0.542 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 0.09 1 0.09 0.84 0.363 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.977 
Error 9.86 97 0.10     
 
a Correctness of ICFR issue classification is measured as follows: For the two higher (lower) severity cases, a 
classification of significant deficiency or material weakness (control deficiency or significant deficiency) is correct; 
a classification of control deficiency (material weakness) is incorrect. Refer to Table 1 for independent variable 
descriptions. All p-values are two-tailed unless otherwise noted. 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Final Severity Rating 
 
Panel B: Repeated measures ANOVAa 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 1.09 1 1.09 0.17 0.679 
Team identity 3.18 1 3.18 0.50 0.480 
Input Quality*Team Identity 2.72 1 2.72 0.43 0.514 
Error 613.64 97 6.33 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity 33.93 1 33.93 6.90 0.010 
Severity*Input Quality 247.24 1 247.24 50.26 <0.001 
Severity*Team Identity 1.27 1 1.27 0.26 0.612 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 16.66 1 16.66 3.39 0.069 
Error 477.13 97 4.92 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type 3.03 1 3.03 1.74 0.190 
Type*Input Quality 0.22 1 0.22 0.13 0.722 
Type*Team Identity 0.42 1 0.42 0.24 0.626 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.07 1 0.07 0.04 0.843 
Error 169.06 97 1.74 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 1.64 1 1.64 0.46 0.500 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 0.08 1 0.08 0.02 0.885 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 2.32 1 2.32 0.65 0.423 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 4.91 1 4.91 1.37 0.245 
Error 347.35 97 3.58     
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Table 8 (continued) 
Final Severity Rating 
 
Panel C: Effects by case – Higher severity-non-IT case a 
            
Tests for significant differences SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
(1) Team identity: Stronger versus weaker 1.04 1 1.04 0.24 0.626 
Error 419.69 97 4.33   
(2) Input quality: More accurate versus less accurate 48.55 1 48.55 11.22 0.001 
Error 419.69 97 4.33   
(3) [Stronger/More accurate – Stronger/Less accurate] 
   vs. [Weaker/More accurate – Weaker/Less accurate] 6.03 1 6.03 1.39 0.241 
Error 419.69 97 4.33   
(4) Stronger/More accurate vs. Stronger/Less accurate 44.97 1 44.97 10.39 0.002 
Error 419.69 97 4.33   
(5) Weaker/More accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 10.05 1 10.05 2.32 0.131 
Error 419.69 97 4.33   
(6) Stronger/More accurate vs. Weaker/More accurate 1.09 1 1.09 0.25 0.617 
Error 419.69 97 4.33   
(7) Stronger/Less accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 5.74 1 5.74 1.33 0.252 
Error 419.69 97 4.33   
 
Panel D: Effects by case – Higher severity-IT-related case a 
            
Tests for significant differences SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
(1) Team identity: Stronger versus weaker 3.59 1 3.59 1.19 0.277 
Error 292.17 97 3.01   
(2) Input quality: More accurate versus less accurate 59.47 1 59.47 19.74 <0.001 
Error 292.17 97 3.01   
(3) [Stronger/More accurate – Stronger/Less accurate] 
   vs. [Weaker/More accurate – Weaker/Less accurate] 0.01 1 0.01 <0.01 0.990 
Error 292.17 97 3.01   
(4) Stronger/More accurate vs. Stronger/Less accurate 29.95 1 29.95 9.94 0.002 
Error 292.17 97 3.01   
(5) Weaker/More accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 29.53 1 29.53 9.80 0.002 
Error 292.17 97 3.01   
(6) Stronger/More accurate vs. Weaker/More accurate 1.94 1 1.94 0.64 0.425 
Error 292.17 97 3.01   
(7) Stronger/Less accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 1.67 1 1.67 0.55 0.458 
Error 292.17 97 3.01   
 
  
	67 
Table 8 (continued) 
Final Severity Rating 
 
Panel E: Effects by case – Lower severity-non-IT case a 
            
Tests for significant differences SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
(1) Team identity: Stronger versus weaker 1.99 1 1.99 0.40 0.527 
Error 478.57 97 4.93   
(2) Input quality: More accurate versus less accurate 71.96 1 71.96 14.58 <0.001 
Error 478.57 97 4.93   
(3) [Stronger/More accurate – Stronger/Less accurate] 
   vs. [Weaker/More accurate – Weaker/Less accurate] 14.76 1 14.76 2.99 0.087 
Error 478.57 97 4.93   
(4) Stronger/More accurate vs. Stronger/Less accurate 76.94 1 76.94 15.59 <0.001 
Error 478.57 97 4.93   
(5) Weaker/More accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 10.63 1 10.63 2.16 0.145 
Error 478.57 97 4.93   
(6) Stronger/More accurate vs. Weaker/More accurate 14.53 1 14.53 2.95 0.089 
Error 478.57 97 4.93   
(7) Stronger/Less accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 2.81 1 2.81 0.57 0.452 
Error 478.57 97 4.93   
 
Panel F: Effects by case – Lower severity-IT-related case a 
            
Tests for significant differences SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
(1) Team identity: Stronger versus weaker 0.57 1 0.57 0.13 0.716 
Error 416.75 97 4.30   
(2) Input quality: More accurate versus less accurate 68.65 1 68.65 15.98 <0.001 
Error 416.75 97 4.30   
(3) [Stronger/More accurate – Stronger/Less accurate] 
   vs. [Weaker/More accurate – Weaker/Less accurate] 3.57 1 3.57 0.83 0.365 
Error 416.75 97 4.30   
(4) Stronger/More accurate vs. Stronger/Less accurate 52.43 1 52.43 12.20 0.001 
Error 416.75 97 4.30   
(5) Weaker/More accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 20.20 1 20.20 4.70 0.033 
Error 416.75 97 4.30   
(6) Stronger/More accurate vs. Weaker/More accurate 0.67 1 0.67 0.16 0.693 
Error 416.75 97 4.30   
(7) Stronger/Less accurate vs. Weaker/Less accurate 3.33 1 3.33 0.78 0.381 
Error 416.75 97 4.30   
a For the dependent variable, final severity rating, participants provided judgments on an 11-point scale with labels 
of “Control deficiency” (1), “Significant deficiency” (6), and “Material weakness” (11). Tests for significant 
differences are performed based on repeated measures ANOVA captured in Table 8, Panel B. All p-values are two-
tailed unless otherwise noted. Refer to Table 1 for independent variable descriptions.  
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Table 9 
Perceptions of IT Specialist and Input Received 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable – Quality of IT specialist inputab 
 
  
Input Quality 
 
 
 
Less More 
 
Team 
Identity 
Stronger 
5.68 6.04 5.86 
(0.37) (0.34) (0.25) 
25 26 51 
Weaker 
4.25 4.69 4.49 
(0.27) (0.37) (0.23) 
23 27 50 
  4.99 5.35 
 
  (0.25) (0.26) 
 
  48 53 
 ANOVA 
Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 4.02 1 4.02 1.36 0.247 
Team identity 48.65 1 48.65 16.44 <0.001 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.03 1 0.03 0.01 0.923 
Error 287.00 97 2.96     
 
Panel B: Dependent variable –IT specialist competenceac 
 
  
Input Quality 
 
 
 
Less More 
 
Team 
Identity 
Stronger 
6.30 6.50 6.40 
(0.33) (0.33) (0.23) 
25 26 51 
Weaker 
4.90 5.42 5.18 
(0.26) (0.34) (0.22) 
23 27 50 
  5.63 5.95 
 
  (0.23) (0.25) 
 
  48 53 
 ANOVA 
Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 3.21 1 3.21 1.23 0.27 
Team identity 38.86 1 38.86 14.87 <0.001 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.65 1 0.65 0.25 0.618 
Error 253.47 97 2.61     
  
	69 
Table 9 (continued) 
Perceptions of IT Specialist and Input Received 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable –IT specialist objectivityad 
 
  
Input Quality 
 
 
 
Less More 
 
Team 
Identity 
Stronger 
6.70 6.62 6.66 
(0.32) (0.22) (0.19) 
25 26 51 
Weaker 
5.38 6.33 5.89 
(0.31) (0.39) (0.26) 
23 27 50 
  6.07 6.47 
 
  (0.24) (0.23) 
 
  48 53 
 ANOVA 
Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 4.77 1 4.77 1.87 0.175 
Team identity 16.49 1 16.49 6.46 0.013 
Input Quality*Team Identity 6.60 1 6.60 2.59 0.111 
Error 247.46 97 2.55     
 
Panel D: Dependent variable –IT specialist trustworthinessae 
 
  
Input Quality 
 
 
 
Less More 
 
Team 
Identity 
Stronger 
6.90 6.42 6.65 
(0.26) (0.31) (0.21) 
25 26 51 
Weaker 
5.18 5.27 5.23 
(0.28) (0.37) (0.24) 
23 27 50 
  6.08 5.83 
 
  (0.23) (0.26) 
 
  48 53 
 ANOVA 
Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 0.97 1 0.97 0.39 0.534 
Team identity 51.68 1 51.68 20.72 <0.001 
Input Quality*Team Identity 2.03 1 2.03 0.82 0.369 
Error 241.89 97 2.49     
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Table 9 (continued) 
Perceptions of IT Specialist and Input Received 
 
Panel E: Dependent variable – Whether would want to work with IT specialist againaf 
 
  
Input Quality 
 
 
 
Less More 
 
Team 
Identity 
Stronger 
2.06 2.45 2.26 
(0.43) (0.40) (0.29) 
25 26 51 
Weaker 
-0.99 -0.65 -0.81 
(0.35) (0.52) 0.32  
23 27 50 
 
 
0.60 0.87 
 
	 	
(0.35) (0.39) 
	
	 	
48 53 
	ANOVA 
Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 3.31 1 3.31 0.69 0.408 
Team identity 237.82 1 237.82 49.71 <0.001 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.02 1 0.02 <0.01 0.950 
Error 464.06 97 4.78     
 
aThe first table in each panel displays the descriptive statistics: mean, (std. error), n. The second table displays the 
results of the standard ANOVA. 
bThe overall quality of the IT specialist input was elicited on an 11-point scale with endpoints “Very low quality” (0) 
and “Very high quality” (10). 
cThe competence of the IT specialist was elicited on an 11-point scale with endpoints “Very low competence” (0) 
and “Very high competence” (10). 
dThe objectivity of the IT specialist was elicited on an 11-point scale with endpoints “Not at all objective” (0) and 
“Extremely objective” (10). 
eThe trustworthiness of the IT specialist was elicited on an 11-point scale with endpoints “Not at all trustworthy” (0) 
and “Extremely trustworthy” (10). 
fWhether the participant would want to work with the IT specialist again was elicited on an 11-point scale with 
endpoints “Definitely not” (-5) and “Definitely” (5). 
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Table 10 
Team Identity Manipulation Coding 
		
 
Participant counta Chi-squared test 
Code categoryb Total Stronger Weaker Χ2 statistic p-Value 
Team integration 44 21 23 0.24 0.625 
IT spec. comp. - IT 17 16 1 15.56 <0.001 
IT spec. comp. - Audit 17 11 6 1.65 0.199 
IT spec. comp. - General 18 9 9 <0.01 0.963 
Effectiveness concern 16 1 15 14.89 <0.001 
Positive 44 39 5 45.37 <0.001 
Negative 30 1 29 37.97 <0.001 
IT spec. preference 21 11 10 0.04 0.846 
IT spec. experience 10 5 5 <0.01 0.974 
Helpful member of team 10 6 4 0.40 0.527 
Sit together 5 1 4 1.96 0.162 
Core member of team 8 4 4 <0.01 0.977 
Other 8 3 5 0.59 0.444 
 Stronger Weaker t-test 
 Mean SE N Mean SE N t P-value 
Response lengthcb 252.98 21.55 51 264.72 20.26 50 -0.40 0.693 
 
aAfter reading the team identity manipulation (via the description of the IT specialist providing input), participants 
were asked the following open-ended question: “You may or may not have not worked with an IT specialist quite 
like this in the past, but please take a minute to think about what it would be like to work with this person. What are 
some thoughts that come to mind? Please type your thoughts below and again, take only a minute to do this.” This 
table captures the results of coding those responses and related analyses. Within the table, “Stronger” and “Weaker” 
refer to the between-subjects Team Identity manipulation. One participant (in the Strong condition) did not provide a 
response, therefore the max N is 50 in each condition. 
bThe following describes the code categories: 
Team integration: Mention integration/teaming/involvement between auditors and IT specialists on the audit 
IT specialist competence – IT: Mention IT specialist's competence (or knowledge/perspective/insight) related to 
IT and IT aspects of audit, regardless of whether positive or negative 
IT specialist preference: Mention if the IT specialist does or does not have a preference/interest in auditing and 
audit-related concepts 
IT specialist competence – General: Mention IT specialist's competence (or knowledge/perspective/insight) in 
general, regardless of whether positive or negative 
Effectiveness concern: Mention any concerns or problems that could result in the audit due to the IT specialist's 
competence or work 
Positive: Overall commentary regarding IT specialist (and/or involvement of IT specialist) is positive 
Negative: Overall commentary regarding IT specialist (and/or involvement of IT specialist) is negative 
IT specialist experience: Mention IT specialist's experience with auditing and/or advisory/consulting 
IT specialist competence – Audit: Mention IT specialist's competence (or knowledge/perspective/insight) related 
to auditing, regardless of whether positive or negative 
Helpful member of team: Mention the IT specialist being a helpful member of the team or just technically a 
member of the team 
Sit together: Mention anything about the IT specialist sitting (or not sitting) with the team 
Core member of team: Refer to the specialist as a core member of the team or an obligatory member of the team 
Other: None of the above codes are mentioned, but description is not left blank 
cResponse length is the character count of the response.  
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Judgment Rationale Coding 
 
Panel A (continued): IT aspect of casea 
 
Repeated measures GLM 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 0.02 1 0.02 0.15 0.696 
Team identity 0.34 1 0.34 2.62 0.109 
Input Quality*Team Identity <0.01 1 <0.01 0.01 0.946 
Total response length 0.99 1 0.99 7.62 0.007 
Error 12.48 96 0.13 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity 0.06 1 0.06 0.80 0.373 
Severity*Input Quality 0.09 1 0.09 1.34 0.250 
Severity*Team Identity 0.05 1 0.05 0.69 0.410 
Severity*Total response length 0.09 1 0.09 1.24 0.268 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.161 0.689 
Error 6.77 96 0.07 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type 0.19 1 0.19 1.93 0.169 
Type*Input Quality 0.04 1 0.04 0.37 0.547 
Type*Team Identity 0.06 1 0.06 0.63 0.430 
Type*Total response length 0.65 1 0.65 6.71 0.011 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.08 1 0.08 0.861 0.356 
Error 9.25 96 0.10 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 0.03 1 0.03 0.41 0.524 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 0.04 1 0.04 0.63 0.430 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.17 0.683 
Severity*Type*Total response length 0.02 1 0.02 0.27 0.608 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.04 1 0.04 0.675 0.413 
Error 5.89 96 0.06     
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Judgment Rationale Coding 
 
Panel B (continued): Mention IT specialista 
 
Repeated measures GLM 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 0.01 1 0.01 0.02 0.888 
Team identity 1.45 1 1.45 3.01 0.086 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.34 1 0.34 0.70 0.403 
Total response length 1.74 1 1.74 3.62 0.060 
Error 46.26 96 0.48 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity 0.07 1 0.07 0.47 0.495 
Severity*Input Quality 0.11 1 0.11 0.77 0.383 
Severity*Team Identity <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.974 
Severity*Total response length 0.12 1 0.12 0.83 0.365 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.27 1 0.27 1.803 0.183 
Error 14.21 96 0.15 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type 0.03 1 0.03 0.30 0.588 
Type*Input Quality 0.40 1 0.40 4.07 0.047 
Type*Team Identity 0.04 1 0.04 0.38 0.541 
Type*Total response length 0.02 1 0.02 0.16 0.695 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.57 1 0.57 5.757 0.018 
Error 9.47 96 0.10 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 0.11 1 0.11 1.24 0.268 
Severity*Type*Input Quality <0.01 1 <0.01 0.05 0.833 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 0.06 1 0.06 0.71 0.403 
Severity*Type*Total response length 0.01 1 0.01 0.11 0.740 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity <0.01 1 <0.01 0.019 0.891 
Error 8.47 96 0.09     
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Judgment Rationale Coding 
 
Panel C (continued): Mention agreement with IT specialista 
 
Repeated measures GLM 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 0.07 1 0.07 0.21 0.651 
Team identity 0.32 1 0.32 0.94 0.334 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.56 1 0.56 1.63 0.205 
Error 33.11 97 0.34 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity 0.21 1 0.21 1.52 0.220 
Severity*Input Quality 0.95 1 0.95 6.99 0.010 
Severity*Team Identity 0.04 1 0.04 0.32 0.573 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.09 1 0.09 0.63 0.431 
Error 13.17 97 0.14 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type <0.01 1 <0.01 0.01 0.917 
Type*Input Quality 0.09 1 0.09 1.27 0.263 
Type*Team Identity 0.02 1 0.02 0.22 0.638 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.17 1 0.17 2.23 0.139 
Error 7.23 97 0.08 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 0.48 1 0.48 4.77 0.031 
Severity*Type*Input Quality <0.01 1 <0.01 0.01 0.940 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 0.15 1 0.15 1.46 0.230 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.10 0.752 
Error 9.85 97 0.10     
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Judgment Rationale Coding 
 
Panel D (continued): Mention disagreement with IT specialista 
 
Repeated measures GLM 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 0.12 1 0.12 3.04 0.084 
Team identity 0.10 1 0.10 2.66 0.106 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.02 1 0.02 0.50 0.480 
Error 3.78 97 0.04 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity <0.01 1 <0.01 0.03 0.866 
Severity*Input Quality 0.17 1 0.17 3.95 0.050 
Severity*Team Identity 0.05 1 0.05 1.26 0.264 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.17 1 0.17 4.03 0.048 
Error 4.13 97 0.04 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.987 
Type*Input Quality <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.969 
Type*Team Identity 0.04 1 0.04 1.57 0.214 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.950 
Error 2.46 97 0.03 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 0.01 1 0.01 0.39 0.534 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 0.01 1 0.01 0.36 0.549 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 0.09 1 0.09 3.66 0.059 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.50 0.483 
Error 2.38 97 0.03     
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Judgment Rationale Coding 
 
Panel E (continued): Number of case facts mentioneda 
 
Repeated measures ANOVA 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 1.91 1 1.91 1.09 0.299 
Team identity 0.65 1 0.65 0.37 0.544 
Input Quality*Team Identity 5.14 1 5.14 2.93 0.090 
Total response length 125.59 1 125.59 71.66 <0.001 
Error 168.26 96 1.75 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity 0.17 1 0.17 0.18 0.674 
Severity*Input Quality 0.20 1 0.20 0.20 0.652 
Severity*Team Identity 0.13 1 0.13 0.13 0.719 
Severity*Total response length 0.02 1 0.02 0.02 0.879 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 2.33 1 2.33 2.388 0.126 
Error 93.61 96 0.98 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type 0.03 1 0.03 0.04 0.849 
Type*Input Quality 0.39 1 0.39 0.47 0.494 
Type*Team Identity 1.14 1 1.14 1.38 0.243 
Type*Total response length 1.31 1 1.31 1.58 0.212 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.95 1 0.95 1.150 0.286 
Error 79.48 96 0.83 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 1.60 1 1.60 1.57 0.214 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 0.84 1 0.84 0.82 0.368 
Severity*Type*Team Identity <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.990 
Severity*Type*Total response length 4.25 1 4.25 4.15 0.044 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 2.71 1 2.71 2.638 0.108 
Error 98.43 96 1.03     
 
	82 
T
A
B
L
E
 1
1 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
Ju
dg
m
en
t R
at
io
na
le
 C
od
in
g 
 Pa
ne
l F
: R
at
io
na
le
 re
sp
on
se
 le
ng
th
a  
 D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
st
at
is
tic
s –
 M
ea
n,
 (S
E)
, N
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
  
 
W
ith
in
: T
yp
e 
 
 
N
o 
IT
 
 
IT
 
 
W
ith
in
: 
Se
ve
ri
ty
 
H
ig
he
r 
 
 
In
pu
t Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
 
In
pu
t Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
 
 
Team Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
20
8.
64
 
21
9.
38
 
21
4.
12
 
 
Team Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
17
8.
52
 
18
6.
85
 
18
2.
76
 
 
(2
7.
84
) 
(5
0.
17
) 
(2
8.
71
) 
 
(2
6.
75
) 
(3
2.
61
) 
(2
0.
97
) 
 
25
 
26
 
51
 
 
25
 
26
 
51
 
 
W
ea
ke
r 
20
6.
48
 
16
4.
41
 
18
3.
76
 
 
W
ea
ke
r 
20
1.
52
 
18
1.
00
 
19
0.
44
 
 
(3
5.
60
) 
(2
5.
58
) 
(2
1.
40
) 
 
(3
0.
23
) 
(2
4.
49
) 
(1
9.
04
) 
 
23
 
27
 
50
 
 
23
 
27
 
50
 
 
 
 
20
7.
60
 
19
1.
38
 
19
9.
09
 
 
 
 
18
9.
54
 
18
3.
87
 
18
6.
56
 
 
 
 
(2
2.
14
) 
(2
7.
83
) 
(1
7.
93
) 
 
 
 
(1
9.
95
) 
(2
0.
09
) 
(1
4.
11
) 
 
 
 
48
 
53
 
10
1 
 
 
 
48
 
53
 
10
1 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
ow
er
 
 
 
In
pu
t Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
 
In
pu
t Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
 
 
Team Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
18
0.
60
 
21
6.
54
 
19
8.
92
 
 
Team Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
19
8.
12
 
22
9.
35
 
21
4.
04
 
 
(2
5.
85
) 
(3
7.
68
) 
(2
2.
93
) 
 
(2
6.
00
) 
(4
5.
13
) 
(2
6.
14
) 
 
25
 
26
 
51
 
 
25
 
26
 
51
 
 
W
ea
ke
r 
17
3.
52
 
18
9.
33
 
18
2.
06
 
 
W
ea
ke
r 
19
9.
83
 
18
3.
67
 
19
1.
10
 
 
(2
7.
32
) 
(2
7.
37
) 
(1
9.
23
) 
 
(3
3.
35
) 
(2
1.
72
) 
(1
9.
14
) 
 
23
 
27
 
50
 
 
23
 
27
 
50
 
 
 
 
17
7.
21
 
20
2.
68
 
19
0.
57
 
 
 
 
19
8.
94
 
20
6.
08
 
20
2.
68
 
 
 
 
(1
8.
59
) 
(2
3.
00
) 
(1
4.
94
) 
 
 
 
(2
0.
72
) 
(2
4.
71
) 
(1
6.
21
) 
 
 
 
48
 
53
 
10
1 
 
 
 
48
 
53
 
10
1 
 
  
	83 
TABLE 11 (continued) 
Judgment Rationale Coding 
 
Panel F (continued): Rationale response lengtha 
 
Repeated measures ANOVA 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 853.36 1 853.36 0.01 0.913 
Team identity 21985.49 1 21985.49 0.31 0.579 
Input Quality*Team Identity 34994.75 1 34994.75 0.49 0.484 
Error 6879384.76 97 70921.49 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity 917.47 1 917.47 0.09 0.769 
Severity*Input Quality 19145.26 1 19145.26 1.81 0.181 
Severity*Team Identity 2303.57 1 2303.57 0.22 0.641 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 314.90 1 314.90 0.03 0.863 
Error 1024031.95 97 10557.03 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type 0.01 1 0.01 <0.01 0.999 
Type*Input Quality 484.50 1 484.50 0.05 0.829 
Type*Team Identity 6563.45 1 6563.45 0.64 0.427 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 17.03 1 17.03 <0.01 0.968 
Error 999815.55 97 10307.38 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 16356.95 1 16356.95 1.38 0.244 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 4898.83 1 4898.83 0.41 0.522 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 11091.87 1 11091.87 0.93 0.336 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 4126.60 1 4126.60 0.35 0.557 
Error 1152795.32 97 11884.49     
 
aParticipants were asked to “Please document the rationale for the judgment and classification you just completed on 
the previous page.” after completing their final judgments for each case. This table captures the results of coding 
those responses and related analyses. The following describes the code categories: 
Panel A: IT aspect of case – Whether or not an IT aspect of the case was mentioned (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
Panel B: Mention IT specialist – Whether or not the IT specialist and/or the input provided by the IT specialist 
was mentioned (0 = no, 1 = yes)   
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TABLE 11 (continued) 
Judgment Rationale Coding 
 
Panel C: Mention agreement with IT specialist (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
Panel D: Mention disagreement with IT specialist (0 = no, 1 = yes) 
Panel E: Number of case facts mentioned 
Panel F: Rationale response length – Response length is the character count of the response 
Refer to Table 1 for independent variable descriptions. 
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TABLE 12 (continued) 
Decision Strategy Analysis 
 
Panel A (continued): Final judgment moves away from IT specialist inputa 
 
Repeated measures GLM 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality <0.01 1 <0.01 0.04 0.845 
Team identity 0.04 1 0.04 0.81 0.371 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.03 1 0.03 0.55 0.460 
Error 4.79 97 0.05 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity 0.07 1 0.07 1.68 0.198 
Severity*Input Quality 0.23 1 0.23 5.57 0.020 
Severity*Team Identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.13 0.722 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.09 1 0.09 2.01 0.159 
Error 4.09 97 0.04 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.963 
Type*Input Quality 0.04 1 0.04 1.49 0.224 
Type*Team Identity 0.04 1 0.04 1.49 0.224 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.963 
Error 2.42 97 0.03 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 0.01 1 0.01 0.30 0.587 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 0.01 1 0.01 0.20 0.653 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 0.09 1 0.09 2.62 0.109 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.39 0.534 
Error 3.38 97 0.04     
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TABLE 12 (continued) 
Decision Strategy Analysis 
 
Panel B (continued): Final judgment matches IT specialist inputa 
 
Repeated measures GLM 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 0.02 1 0.02 0.31 0.577 
Team identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.10 0.747 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.31 1 0.31 5.00 0.028 
Error 5.99 97 0.06 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity 0.01 1 0.01 0.19 0.661 
Severity*Input Quality 0.16 1 0.16 2.24 0.138 
Severity*Team Identity 0.08 1 0.08 1.17 0.282 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.980 
Error 6.75 97 0.07 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type 0.04 1 0.04 0.72 0.400 
Type*Input Quality 0.08 1 0.08 1.59 0.210 
Type*Team Identity 0.15 1 0.15 3.08 0.082 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.12 0.726 
Error 4.72 97 0.05 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type <0.01 1 <0.01 0.01 0.946 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 0.01 1 0.01 0.20 0.656 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 0.05 1 0.05 0.78 0.378 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.10 1 0.10 1.60 0.209 
Error 5.85 97 0.06     
 	
	89 
T
A
B
L
E
 1
2 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
D
ec
is
io
n 
St
ra
te
gy
 A
na
ly
si
s 
 Pa
ne
l C
: N
o 
ch
an
ge
 fr
om
 in
iti
al
 ju
dg
m
en
ta  
 C
ou
nt
s b
y 
co
nd
iti
on
 a
nd
 c
as
e 
 
 
W
ith
in
: I
ss
ue
 T
yp
e 
 
 
N
on
-I
T
 
 
 
IT
-r
el
at
ed
 
 
 
T
ot
al
 a
cr
os
s t
yp
e 
 
W
ith
in
: 
Se
ve
ri
ty
 
H
ig
he
r 
 
 
In
pu
t 
Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
 
In
pu
t 
Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
 
In
pu
t 
Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
To
ta
l 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
To
ta
l 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
To
ta
l 
Team 
Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
9 
9 
18
 
 
Team 
Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
13
 
8 
21
 
 
Team 
Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
22
 
17
 
39
 
W
ea
ke
r 
13
 
8 
21
 
 
W
ea
ke
r 
10
 
5 
15
 
 
W
ea
ke
r 
23
 
13
 
36
 
 
To
ta
l 
22
 
17
 
 
 
 
To
ta
l 
23
 
13
 
 
 
 
To
ta
l 
45
 
30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
ow
er
 
 
 
In
pu
t 
Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
 
In
pu
t 
Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
 
In
pu
t 
Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
To
ta
l 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
To
ta
l 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
To
ta
l 
Team 
Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
6 
8 
14
 
 
Team 
Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
6 
11
 
17
 
 
Team 
Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
12
 
19
 
31
 
W
ea
ke
r 
6 
14
 
20
 
 
W
ea
ke
r 
8 
10
 
18
 
 
W
ea
ke
r 
14
 
24
 
38
 
 
To
ta
l 
12
 
22
 
 
 
 
To
ta
l 
14
 
21
 
 
 
 
To
ta
l 
26
 
43
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
ot
al
 
ac
ro
ss
 
se
ve
ri
ty
 
 
 
In
pu
t 
Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
 
In
pu
t 
Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
 
In
pu
t 
Q
ua
lit
y 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
To
ta
l 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
To
ta
l 
 
 
 
L
es
s 
M
or
e 
To
ta
l 
Team 
Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
15
 
17
 
32
 
 
Team 
Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
19
 
19
 
38
 
 
Team 
Identity 
St
ro
ng
er
 
34
 
36
 
70
 
W
ea
ke
r 
19
 
22
 
41
 
 
W
ea
ke
r 
18
 
15
 
33
 
 
W
ea
ke
r 
37
 
37
 
74
 
 
To
ta
l 
34
 
39
 
 
 
 
To
ta
l 
37
 
34
 
 
 
 
To
ta
l 
71
 
73
 
 
 	
	90 
TABLE 12 (continued) 
Decision Strategy Analysis 
 
Panel C (continued): No change from initial judgmenta 
 
Repeated measures GLM 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 0.07 1 0.07 0.22 0.639 
Team identity 0.09 1 0.09 0.27 0.607 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.11 1 0.11 0.34 0.564 
Error 31.42 97 0.32 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity 0.15 1 0.15 0.63 0.431 
Severity*Input Quality 2.56 1 2.56 10.81 0.001 
Severity*Team Identity 0.18 1 0.18 0.76 0.384 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.16 1 0.16 0.69 0.409 
Error 22.96 97 0.24 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type 0.01 1 0.01 0.04 0.850 
Type*Input Quality 0.14 1 0.14 0.74 0.391 
Type*Team Identity 0.46 1 0.46 2.42 0.123 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.03 1 0.03 0.15 0.703 
Error 18.34 97 0.19 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 0.05 1 0.05 0.30 0.585 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 0.01 1 0.01 0.04 0.852 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 0.06 1 0.06 0.34 0.559 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.51 1 0.51 3.20 0.077 
Error 15.41 97 0.16     
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TABLE 12 (continued) 
Decision Strategy Analysis 
 
Panel D (continued): Final judgment moves toward IT specialist inputa 
 
Repeated measures GLM 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 0.06 1 0.06 0.21 0.652 
Team identity 0.13 1 0.13 0.48 0.492 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.02 1 0.02 0.05 0.817 
Error 27.28 97 0.28 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity <0.01 1 <0.01 0.01 0.930 
Severity*Input Quality 1.59 1 1.59 5.61 0.020 
Severity*Team Identity 0.06 1 0.06 0.20 0.654 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 1.14 1 1.14 4.03 0.048 
Error 27.53 97 0.28 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type 0.12 1 0.12 0.53 0.467 
Type*Input Quality 0.01 1 0.01 0.02 0.884 
Type*Team Identity 0.02 1 0.02 0.10 0.757 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.02 1 0.02 0.08 0.785 
Error 22.08 97 0.23 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type 0.11 1 0.11 0.64 0.427 
Severity*Type*Input Quality <0.01 1 <0.01 0.02 0.900 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 0.07 1 0.07 0.42 0.517 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.30 1 0.30 1.75 0.189 
Error 16.76 97 0.17     
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TABLE 12 (continued) 
Decision Strategy Analysis 
 
Panel E (continued): Average initial judgment and IT specialist inputa 
 
Repeated measures GLM 
            
Between Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Input Quality 0.17 1 0.17 1.52 0.220 
Team identity 0.08 1 0.08 0.70 0.405 
Input Quality*Team Identity 0.05 1 0.05 0.48 0.490 
Error 10.98 97 0.11 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity 0.04 1 0.04 0.53 0.469 
Severity*Input Quality 0.08 1 0.08 1.06 0.305 
Severity*Team Identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.17 0.679 
Severity*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.17 1 0.17 2.22 0.140 
Error 7.20 97 0.07 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Type <0.01 1 <0.01 0.01 0.931 
Type*Input Quality 0.25 1 0.25 3.29 0.073 
Type*Team Identity 0.01 1 0.01 0.10 0.758 
Type*Input Quality*Team Identity <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.996 
Error 7.25 97 0.08 
  
      Within Subjects 
     Source SS df MS F-Ratio p-Value 
Severity*Type <0.01 1 <0.01 <0.01 0.960 
Severity*Type*Input Quality 0.09 1 0.09 1.44 0.233 
Severity*Type*Team Identity 0.09 1 0.09 1.37 0.244 
Severity*Type*Input Quality*Team Identity 0.03 1 0.03 0.50 0.480 
Error 6.28 97 0.07     
aThis table captures the results of identifying participant decision strategy based on initial judgment, final judgment, 
and IT specialist input received. The following describes the decision strategy participants used: 
Panel A: Participant moved from initial judgment away from IT specialist input to arrive at final judgment  
Panel B: Participant matched IT specialist input in final judgment 
Panel C: Participant did not change from initial judgment (i.e., final judgment is equal to initial judgment) 
Panel D: Participant moved from initial judgment toward the IT specialist input to arrive at final judgment (but 
did not average) 
Panel E: Participant averaged their initial judgment and the IT specialist input to arrive at final judgment 
Refer to Table 1 for independent variable descriptions.	  
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following pages provide screenshots of the experimental instrument from Qualtrics. 
Additional information is provided in brackets. 
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[Note: The order of the four cases was randomized across participants.] 
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 [The following information is displayed for the stronger team identity condition only.] 
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[The following information is displayed for the weaker team identity condition only.] 
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[Note: The cases were presented in the same order as in the initial assessments. The client 
information and initial rating appeared as below regardless of condition. “Your initial rating” 
(listed as a “6” in these example screenshots) reflected the number the participant entered during 
the initial assessment for that case.] 
 
[Note: The “IT specialist input” information displayed below reflects the more accurate 
condition as the control issues described are designed to be between an SD and MW.] 
 
[Note: The “IT specialist input” information displayed below reflects the less accurate condition 
as the control issues described are designed to be between an SD and MW.] 
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[Note: The following questions follow regardless of condition.] 
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[Note: Clicking on the link labeled “Raven Systems Corp. Information” displays the client 
information; clicking on the “IT Specialist Input” link displays the IT specialist input provided 
(input provided depends on condition as noted earlier).] 
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[Note: Clicking on the link labeled “Raven Systems Corp. Information” displays the client 
information; clicking on the “IT Specialist Input” link displays the IT specialist input provided 
(input provided depends on condition as noted earlier).] 
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[Note: The “IT specialist input” information displayed below reflects the more accurate 
condition as the control issues described are designed to be between a CD and SD.] 
 
[Note: The “IT specialist input” information displayed below reflects the less accurate condition 
as the control issues described are designed to be between a CD and SD.] 
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[Note: The following questions follow regardless of condition.] 
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[Note: Clicking on the link labeled “Alexander Corp. Information” displays the client 
information; clicking on the “IT Specialist Input” link displays the IT specialist input provided 
(input provided depends on condition as noted earlier).] 
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[Note: Clicking on the link labeled “Alexander Corp. Information” displays the client 
information; clicking on the “IT Specialist Input” link displays the IT specialist input provided 
(input provided depends on condition as noted earlier).] 
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[Note: The “IT specialist input” information displayed below reflects the more accurate 
condition as the control issues described are designed to be between an SD and MW.] 
 
[Note: The “IT specialist input” information displayed below reflects the less accurate condition 
as the control issues described are designed to be between an SD and MW.] 
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[Note: The following questions follow regardless of condition.] 
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[Note: Clicking on the link labeled “Ballas Company Information” displays the client 
information; clicking on the “IT Specialist Input” link displays the IT specialist input provided 
(input provided depends on condition as noted earlier).] 
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[Note: Clicking on the link labeled “Ballas Company Information” displays the client 
information; clicking on the “IT Specialist Input” link displays the IT specialist input provided 
(input provided depends on condition as noted earlier).] 
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[Note: The “IT specialist input” information displayed below reflects the more accurate 
condition as the control issues described are designed to be between a CD and SD.] 
 
[Note: The “IT specialist input” information displayed below reflects the less accurate condition 
as the control issues described are designed to be between a CD and SD.] 
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[Note: The following questions follow regardless of condition.] 
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[Note: Clicking on the link labeled “Harper Corp. Information” displays the client information; 
clicking on the “IT Specialist Input” link displays the IT specialist input provided (input 
provided depends on condition as noted earlier).] 
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[Note: Clicking on the link labeled “Harper Corp. Information” displays the client information; 
clicking on the “IT Specialist Input” link displays the IT specialist input provided (input 
provided depends on condition as noted earlier).] 
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[End of instrument] 
